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This dissertation discusses two research problems. First topic is strategic information 
management in supply chain, and second topic is analytical modeling approach in productivity 
dilemma. The first two chapters of dissertation discuss the impact of information asymmetry and 
competition on vertical contractual relationships, and risk neutral firms’ strategic ordering 
decisions with minimal assumptions. Modern business environment caused by competition and 
information asymmetry plagues most firms across industries, often leading to suboptimal 
outcomes. Given the lead times in planning capacity, suppliers prefer earlier orders from their 
downstream partners (retailers). Much attention has been given in the literature to Advance 
Purchase Discount (APD), where the supplier lowers the wholesale price to entice the retailers to 
order early. In this dissertation, we suggest another avenue of early purchase model considering 
more realistic ways - competition between downstream retailers and information flows (from 
information acquisition to dissemination) in supply chain. We show that with one retailer having 
“better” market demand information on uncertain demand than the other, the supplier can induce 
earlier ordering from the better-informed retailer without any reduction in the wholesale price, or 
creating rationing risk. In addition, we investigate firm’s information investment decisions 
corresponding to the timing of the orders. We extend the model with different information 
structures of firms such as imperfect and evolving information. In reality, firms can have more 
accurate market information near the selling season by acquiring it from more diverse resources. 
Consistent with practice, we explorer firm’s equilibrium outcomes of endogenous sequencing 
game with this setting.  
The third chapter of dissertation is in the trade-off between production efficiency and 
new product innovation. A firm’s ability to compete over time has been rooted not only in 
improved efficiency, but also in its ability to be simultaneously innovative (Abernathy (1978)). 
This trade-off between efficiency and innovation has long been discussed in the business context, 
but limited analytical research has been done using the ‘extreme value theory’ (Dahan & 
Mendelson (2001)) to investigate this issue. Our model considers important exogenous 
innovation factors such as innovation characteristics (Benner & Tushman (2003)) and degree of 
competition, which has yielded the following theoretical results and practical implications. First, 
we highlight new product characteristics. If R&D projects are paradigm-shifting innovations, 
there is a stronger adverse effect between efficiency and innovation than incremental innovation. 
Second, competition results in underinvestment effort in innovation performance for the firms. 
For example, in the symmetric firms’ competition, the optimal size of R&D projects decreased, 
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Endogenous Sequence of Event in
Supply Chain
1.1 Introduction
Timely orders with valuable market information are one of the critical success
factors for both suppliers and retailers especially in modern dynamic business envi-
ronments with ever-shortened product life cycles, and longer production times caused
by global outsourcing. In this context, ways to induce early orders from retailers in
order to better manage their production plans, have received considerable attention.
The so-called carrot-and-stick approach is used to entice retailers (customers) to or-
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der early in operations management literature. Much attention has been given to
Advance Purchase Discounts (APD) (cf. Cachon, 2004; Dong & Zhu, 2007), where
the supplier lowers the wholesale price to lure the retailers to order early (the car-
rot). Another remedy for inducing early orders is to create capacity rationing risk -
a product may not be available in the future (cf. Liu & Ryzin, 2008; Su, 2008) (the
stick).
In the past decade, the main argument in the literature for inducing early order is
considering risk between supply chain partners. For instance, in the APD literature,
inventory risk to a supplier caused by a supply-demand mismatch is a key drive for
early purchase discounts. The harder but more realistic problem, however, exists
since in some industries the supplier has no inventory risk. Instead, in many cases,
the supplier starts production only after receiving customers’ Firm Orders (FO).
The following example from the fashion industry helps to motivate this research:
VF Corporation is the world’s largest apparel company, with more than 30 leading
brands including Wrangler, The North Face, Lee, Nautica, etc. VF has outsourced
more than half of its production to third party suppliers outside of the United States.
The majority of the VF brands’ products are available only for one season, with
clearly defined and extremely short life cycles. This makes it very difficult for the
firm to estimate market demand. As a result, the demand planning is one of the
most important processes in their industry. More importantly, production lead time
after ordering is up to six months. The main reason for long lead times lies in the
3
start time of production for the supplier. Ellen Martin - the vice president of Supply
Chain Systems at VF - argues that the problem is in acquiring the raw material for
the supplier because no supplier is going to make fabric without a purchase order
(PO) in hand (Supply chain leader (2006)).
In this paper, we suggest another avenue for an early purchase model considering
more realistic ways - competition between downstream retailers and information flows
(from information acquisition to dissemination) in the supply chain. We mainly an-
alyze the case of competitive markets with demand uncertainty, wherein the choices
of supply chain configuration - decisions about the timing of orders and market in-
formation acquisition - are all endogenous to the competing firms. More specifically,
two competing firms’ timing of orders is completely endogenous in a given time hori-
zon, and information acquisition decisions are also choice variables for each firm. We
characterize each firms’ choices in equilibrium and analyze the effects of these choices
on quantities ordered and profits.
From a broader supply chain perspective, optimal timing of orders is important
not only for a firm itself but also for its partners because the quality of market infor-
mation affects the performance of the entire supply chain including vertical partners
as well as horizontal competitors (cf. Chen (2003)). Moreover, the current business
environment caused by competition and information asymmetry plagues most firms
across industries, often leading to suboptimal outcomes. So, one of the strategic
decisions any firm (both informed and uninformed) faces centers on when to order
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their product or key component. A firm can place an order either well in advance
of the selling season or relatively close to the selling season. Timing of the order is
more critical when production lead time is much longer than the selling season such
as in the apparel industry, and it is the situation we consider in this research. To
find the optimal timing for ordering, the ordering mechanism is made up of endoge-
nous timing of events: firms are not constrained to placing orders in the feasible time
horizon despite the different quality of information. Further, from realistic settings
where information endowment is not determined by default, information acquisition
decisions necessarily precede endogenous sequencing of events, and they are another
choice for the firms before deciding the timing of the order. Hence, a more rooted
question to consider is whether the endogenous sequencing model is beneficial for
acquiring information by investing in a sizable budget. Surprisingly, we prove that
with one retailer having "better" information on uncertain demand than the other,
the supplier can induce earlier ordering from the better-informed retailer without any
reduction in the wholesale price, or creating rationing risk.
The main model for this research is motivated from a strategic information man-
agement model by Anand and Goyal (2009). In their model of horizontal competition
between an informed and an uninformed firm with a common upstream supplier,
material and information flows intersect through leakage of order information to un-
intended recipients. Thus, an added complication in our model is that the upstream
supplier is strategic such as in the Newbury Comics case (Singer(1999)). In the cur-
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rent study, we model timing of orders and information acquisition decisions as decision
variables in the competitive scenarios. Hence, with minimal assumptions, this paper
explores generalized strategic information management models by analyzing the im-
pact of market information and competition on procurement and timing of events.
We show how firms’ ordering behavior for the upstream partner is differentiated by
the quality of information they have, and what the maximum investment level is for
resolving uncertainty.
With timing flexibility, understanding this concept holds the key to addressing
the following questions, which are the focus of this paper: (i) When both firms can
acquire demand information, for instance, by investing in information systems or by
requesting consulting, which firm is going to invest in market information, and how
is it related to the timing of orders and the firm’s profits? (ii) What are the optimal
(equilibrium) timing and quantity of ordering for two competing firms? (iii) When
intensity of competition is changed (for example, a substitute market), how do the
optimal timing and quantity of ordering change?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Next section reviews the related
literature, and section 3 presents our modeling framework with each player’s trade-
offs; Sections 4 and 5 present analysis for the Endogenous Sequencing Game (ESG);
Section 6 is analysis of the Information Acquisition Game (IAG). Concluding remarks
are in Section 7.
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1.2 Literature Review
We review a variety of research streams about the timing of ordering in both
operations management and economics. Plenty of literature in the Operations Man-
agement field analyzes optimal sales timing of the seller considering various types of
factors such as demand uncertainty, inventory risk, production lead time, capacity
constraints, and so on. Thus, many papers deal with sales timing as a key influence
on a firm’s profit.
One stream of research is referred to as the Advanced Purchase Discount (APD)
or Advance Booking Discount (ABD) model. Tang et al (2004) considered a scheme
to entice customer’s early commitment at a discount price prior to the commencement
of the sales season. They analyze how the degree of demand uncertainty, correlation,
and the level of market share affect the optimal discount factor. McCardle et al
(2004) extended the ABD concept to a duopoly competition model taking into ac-
count consumer risk preferences and degree of brand disloyalty. Under this situation,
they introduce possible scenarios about whether to introduce the ABD program for
two competing retailers. Cachon (2004) also considered the seller’s optimal contract
timing decision in the presence of inventory risk between a seller and a buyer. He
came up with a Pareto set combining push and pull contracts. Push contract refers
to a system inventory that is completely pushed to the retailer when demand is un-
certain and the supplier merely responds to the retailer’s early order. Pull contract
means that the supplier takes the full inventory responsibility in the supply chain and
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that the retailer merely pulls inventory from the supplier as demand occurs, though
the retailer is constrained by the supplier’s inventory availability. Dong & Zhu (2007)
generalized Cachon’s model with exogenous wholesale prices in a two-periods game.
Depending upon the wholesale price in two periods, they show the Pareto optimal
contract mechanism. They also identified conditions that enable Pareto improvement
by introducing a new ordering opportunity to firms who were bound by a single order-
ing opportunity. Milner & Kouvelis (2005) considered the impact of different demand
characteristics on contract mechanisms in similar settings with Cachon (2004) and
Dong & Zhu (2007).
Another stream of research regarding sales timing issues is pricing mechanisms
between retailers and consumers. Several papers investigated how to induce an early
purchase using different prices. Liu and Ryzin (2008) claim that rationing risk - a
product may not be available in the future - is a possible option for the risk averse
customers for inducing early purchase with a high price. They argue whether the re-
stricting supply is a profitable strategy or not, and if it is profitable, the ideal rationing
parameter has been obtained. Su (2008) also modeled pricing mechanisms consider-
ing strategic customer behavior, which included a level of patience and individual
value for the product. When high-value customers are proportionately less patient,
markdown pricing policies are effective because the high-value customers would buy
early at high prices (as in the fashion industry) while the low-value customers are
willing to wait. He also claimed that pure markdown conditions, meaning that prices
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are never increased during the selling season, are based on the customer’s patience
level and the cost of waiting.
From the supplier’s (seller) perspective, uncertainty about future demand and in-
formation asymmetry among supply chain players are important factors for optimal
sales timing decisions. Cvsa and Gilbert (2002) modeled a supplier’s optimal whole-
sale price commitment with sales timing using a single supplier and two identical
competing buyers. They demonstrated how a supplier can reduce his risk by offering
early order opportunities to downstream buyers. Their main finding is that there is
a trade-off for buyers between early purchase with uncertain demand (Stackelberg
leader effect) and late purchase with no demand uncertainty (production flexibility).
Using the Stackelberg model with an uncertainty factor, they claimed that the supplier
can benefit (diminishing risk) from providing adequate pricing incentives (discount)
to entice downstream buyers to commit to purchase quantity before demand infor-
mation is revealed. In other words, there is a direct trade-off between the level of
demand uncertainty and price discounts. Ferguson (2003) also considered timing of
commitment under demand uncertainty. He set up a single supplier - a manufacturer
newsvendor model with different lead-times regarding timing of orders. He claimed
that the manufacturer might be better off with a contract that requires an early
commitment to its order quantity. The choice of commitment time depends upon
the probability that uncertainty over demand is resolved prior to the buyer setting
its production quantity. Similar with Cvsa and Gilbert (2002), the possibility of a
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demand information update is also a key role of the model. Taylor (2006) also con-
sidered sales timing for a supplier considering the impact of information asymmetry
between the supplier and a retailer - the level of effort for accurate forecasting for the
retailer. If the retailer exerts sales efforts prior to the selling season or has superior
information about market demand, the supplier may prefer to sell early. It means
that when the manufacturer sells early, the retailer consequently sets the high effort
level to forecast demand accurately.
The economics side of research also considers endogenous timing of ordering using
game theory models. A seminal work by Gal-Or (1987) showed that an informed
firm might have higher profits by not moving first in a model with a privately in-
formed Stackelberg leader-follower game, which is also considered in our analysis.
Maggi (1996) considered an endogenous investment decision game that generates a
trade-off between commitment (early investment with uncertainty) and flexibility
(late investment with certainty). Surprisingly, the author argued that an investment
game yields asymmetric equilibria: one firm chooses a preemptive strategy and the
other firm follows a wait-and-see strategy resulting in (approximately) a Stackelberg
outcome. Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) modeled endogenous timing of moves in a
duopoly game using Stackelberg and Cournot equilibria with complete information
by allowing firms to choose the time of play in addition to choosing a specific action.
They claimed that in the observable delay game, multiple equilibria might happen
depending on preplay communication, flexibility of moves, or observable delays by a
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rival. Mailath (1993) is a somewhat similar topic with our research. He considered
an endogenous move for the informed firm with an asymmetric information game.
He modeled a two-period game assuming that movement for the incumbent is fully
observable. He assumed that the informed firm has only two choices, either being a
leader by moving in the first period or moving simultaneously with the uninformed
firm in the second period. His main claim is that even if there is an advantage for the
informed firm to move in the second period with complete information, the informed
firm still prefers to move first rather than simultaneously in the second period because
the informed firm has only a limited advantage by moving in the second period.
Various issues related to information acquisition and demand forecasting in supply
chain have been studied in the literature. Taylor & Xiao (2009) explored contract
mechanisms with rebate and return contract. They showed the retailer, manufac-
turer, and total system may benefit from the retailer having even inferior forecasting.
Also, they showed that the retailer may overinvest in forecasting. Lariviere (2002)
considered the relationship between information acquisition and contract mechanism.
He showed a screening mechanism for inducing investing retailers to take a differ-
ent contract from non-investing retailers requires restricting returns. Shin & Tunca
(2009) showed that with common pricing schemes, downstream firm under Cournot
competition overinvest in demand forecasting.
In addition, several operations management papers deal with the value of in-
formation in a supply chain. Gavirneno et al (1999) studied partial and complete
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information sharing in a supplier-retailer setting, and compared these to a base case
of no information. They concluded that information is always beneficial. Lee et al
(2000) also considered the benefits of information sharing in a two-level supply chain.
By information sharing, the supply chain can be more efficient with regard to inven-
tory reduction and expected cost reduction. Whang et al (1998) also considered value
of postponement. They claimed that postponement can improve both flexibility and
demand forecast for a supply chain.
In sum, although all papers mentioned in the Operations Management (OM) field
consider timing of contract sales, most papers also consider the upstream seller’s
(supplier) optimal sales timing. The main difference in this paper from the above-
mentioned literature is that we consider information asymmetry between two down-
stream competitors as well as endogenous timing of orders for two competing buyers.
Also, all models except McCardle (2004) and Cvsa and Gilbert (2002) do not consider
competition between downstream partners. Moreover, our model claims that without
providing a discount for early purchasing, the supplier can induce an early purchase
by using information leakage. We will discuss this further in the next section. In
addition, most of the OM side of research considers the seller’s perspective whereas
our model also reflects the buyer’s trade-off and equilibrium analysis. Compared with
the economic side of research, our paper considers every possible endogenous move
of two competing firms - both the informed and uninformed firms. Mailath’s (1993)
paper is similar to ours, but he also fixed the uninformed firm to place its order in
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the second period. Also, his analysis does not consider every possible difference in
the demand information (intercept). We analyze every possible situation regarding
variability of demand (, in our model) with a holistic point of view, whereas Mailath
modeled a single limited case ( is less than 3). Our paper considers every player’s
(the incumbent, the entrant, and the supplier) trade-off and equilibrium set including
the supplier’s possible information leakage in a more realistic fashion.
1.3 The Model
We formalize the impact of information asymmetry and competition on procure-
ment and the timing of events by analyzing a supply chain consisting of one supplier
and two horizontally competing firms. The two firms produce a seasonal product,
which are substitutes. We assume that the demand curve is linear1 and downward-
sloping, with an uncertain intercept e. The inverse demand curve for product  is
linear of the form: (3−) = e −  − 3−, where  is the quantity put in
the market for product . The demand intercept e is random and can take one of
two values2: a high value  with probability , and a low value  with probability
1The linear demand curve has been widely used in the modeling literature. It has an appeal-
ing interpretation as the demand arising from the utility-maximizing behavior of consumers with
quadratic, additively separable utility functions (Singh and Vives (1984)). Other demand curve such
as exponential also works in our model. However, it adds only complication without further insight.
2In some of scenarios in our model, market demand information can be considered as a signal
between informed and uninformed players. Thus, intercept e leads to “types” of player in the
signaling game. Indeed, model can be extended to multiple demand states (with piecewise differen-
tiable functions similar to continuous function) e = { 12 } with different probability
( 1 2 ) (We proved multiple demand states in the appendix.) Its managerial insight is
same with two-type model without finding additional implication. (Laffont and Martimort (2002),
chapter 2, Appendix 2.1)
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(1 − ); these values are common knowledge. We refer to the parameter  ∈ (0 1]
as the substitutability parameter, where   0 signifies that the two products are
strategic substitutes.3 When  = 1, two products are perfect substitutes (essentially
identical). Product substitutability implies that the demand for a product increases
with an increase in the price of the other product (Singh & Vives (1984)). The
mean demand intercept is  =  + (1 − ) and the proxy of demand interval
 = . We also assume that all players are risk neutral firms.
The two firms source their product (or a key component) from a common supplier.
The lead time for delivering orders is . Hence, if  marks the start of the selling
season, then the latest time to place orders with the supplier is  time units before
 We denote this time epoch by  (Figure 1). We also assume that there are no
capacity constraints.
Once the firms start selling, demand uncertainty is resolved by default— i.e., once
the selling season begins, the firms observe the realization of the random intercept
̃ However, firms can acquire market information early (at time )4 by investing in
various market research activities5. Information acquisition is expensive, and firms
incur a cost  to acquire (perfect) information.
The sequence of events is as follows. Firms decide whether to acquire informa-
3The canonical example of substitute market in fashion industry is leather jacket and viscose
rayon jacket.
4Acquiring information betwen times  and  is useless since the information cannot be leveraged
to change the order quantities given the lead time. Hence we focus on the more interesting case
where   
5Newbury Comics case (Singer (1999)) details how acquiring information before the selling season






Firms can acquire 
demand information at cost K. 
Production lead time (l)
Latest time firms can place order. 
0 T
Information is revealed. 
Figure 1.1: Sequence of Events
tion at time E. This marks the start of the Information Acquisition Game (IAG).
Thereafter, based on information acquisition decision in IAG, firms decide when to
order (anytime between 0 and  is feasible). We call this the Endogenous Sequencing
Game (ESG). The supplier then delivers the products before the start of the selling
season. Demand and profits are realized at time 
A key feature of our model is that we impose very limited structure on the sequence
of events — except for the sequence of the two meta games, IAG followed by ESG.
Within the ESG, the sequence is completely endogenous. This is in stark contrast with
extant literature where most papers assume a well defined and immovable sequence
of events (cf. Anand & Goyal (2009); Mailath (1993)). Instead, various possible
sequences of events can be created, and we will discuss it further in analysis section.
In IAG, there are three possible outcomes: (I, I) when both firms acquire infor-
mation; (I, NI) or (NI,I) when one firm invests in information acquisition, and the
other firm did not; (NI, NI) when no firm invests in information. These information
acquisition decisions are observable to all. We index two types of buyers - the in-
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formed firm (incumbent), the uninformed firm (entrant) - and the supplier, by i, e,
and s respectively.
The information structure imposed by the IAG results in two broad kinds of games
under ESG between the two firms: a game of complete information where either both
firms are informed or none are; and a game of incomplete information where only
one firm is informed. The appropriate equilibrium concept for the dynamic game of
complete information is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, whereas for the game
of incomplete information, we use the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
An added complication in ESG is that the informed firm and the supplier are
strategic, i.e., the informed firm’s incentives to share information with the supplier
and the supplier’s incentives to leak this information to the uninformed firm. At the
beginning of the ESG with incomplete information, only the informed firm has access
to demand information. This setting allows us to analyze the effect of (potential)
information leakage on the incentives for information revelation and dissemination.
We also assume that the wholesale price  is exogenously fixed throughout time
horizon, and without loss of generality, we normalize  to zero67.
The equilibrium in our model has three components that are intertwined with
each other: () Information flows (from information acquisition to information dis-
6Wholesale price is exogenously fixed throughout time horizon in our model. Given a proof of
the zero whole sale price case, it is trivial to show that the conclusions follow from the full premise.
7When the supplier controls and sets the different wholesale price at time E and L, he has a
second instrument (other than leakage) by which to influence material and information flows and,
hence, to optimize his own profits. Depending on different wholesale price, equilibrium outcome of
ESG can be changed and pure insight of model is faded. Thus, different wholesale price can be
remained for future research direction.
16
semination in the supply chain) () Material flows (the order quantities of the two
suppliers), and () Timing of orders.
1.3.1 Discussion of Assumptions
The analysis in this paper relies on three key assumptions whose impact on our
results we discuss in this section. First, given buyers order timing decisions, the
supplier starts production with a purchase (firm) order, and there is no capacity
constraints as briefly mentioned in the introduction part (VF Inc. example). Thus,
there is no risk of early production for the supplier in our model. It is a contrast
from the Advanced Purchase Discount (APD) model (cf. Cachon (2004), Dong &
Zhu (2007)). In APD model, one of the reasons that the supplier has inventory risk
is due to capacity constraints, and it is the motivation that the supplier should have
pre-book inventory. It implicitly assumes that the supplier starts production without
the buyer’s order. Furthermore, the APD model mainly analyzes the Pareto optimal
supply chain mechanism by risk sharing and how to coordinate to maximize total
supply chain efficiency. In contrast with the APD literature, our model analyzes
profit maximizing firms’ (buyers and a supplier) strategic ordering behaviors.
Second, we assume that in the time interval [0 ], both firms can modify their
order quantity multiple times8. However, we assume that multiple orders after time
L are not available throughout the paper for the following two reasons. First, addi-
8For example, when both parties order at time E, the uninformed firm can change his order
quantity after the supplier’s leakage.
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tional orders near the selling season with shorter production lead time are typically
much more expensive than when ordering at regular intervals and this might have an
extreme effect on a firm’s profitability. The best example of this is also the textile and
fashion industry. Lead times for design, production, and distribution are normally
longer than the selling season, so buyers (or retailers) must commit to their order
quantities well in advance of observing sales. Even though sometimes they use rush
ordering called ‘Quick Response (QR)’ (cf. Krishnan et al (2010), Cachon & Swinney
(2009)) with a short lead time, it is usually much more expensive than the regular
order. Multiple orders with a multiple periods model might be a subject for future
research. Second, to see the pure effect of endogenous sequencing and information
acquisition effect, multiple ordering opportunities are not appropriate in our model.
Third, our model assumes very limited observability for more practical point of
view. The only observable is that one firm can notice whether the order has been
placed from his competitor after time E, but not the specific order quantity. For
example, the uninformed firm can only observe after time E whether the informed
firm placed order at time E 9. In the existing literature of the endogenous move game,
they assume that the competitor’s every movement is fully and perfectly observable
(for example, Mailath (1993) two-periods sequencing model). Even in the strategic
inventory models such as Saloner (1987) and Moolgard (2000), they have very strong
assumptions that production and inventory from a previous period is totally observ-
9It is different from imperfect observability in that the informed firm’s action is perfectly observ-
able, but the only observable is whether order was placed or not. Detailed order quantity can be
acquired by supplier’s leakage decision.
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able to the competitor. (They claim that the previous period’s inventory can restore
a Stackelberg leader advantage in the next period.) In addition, in all literature ana-
lyzing sequencing model (cf. Gal-OR (1987), Dowrick (1986), Huck et al (2001), and
Liu (2005)), the following action is always based on fully observed precedence.
1.4 Endogenous Sequencing Game (ESG)
1.4.1 Analysis of feasible set of time
The expected sales and profits with order timing [0 ] are useful starting point
in the Endogenous Sequencing Game (ESG). The following proposition compares the
expected order quantity in the different feasible sets of time.
Proposition 1 (Comparison between time set [0 ] and [])
I. If feasible timing of order is [0 ], there exists the only equilibrium point in En-
dogenous Sequencing Game (ESG), and is as follows:
(i) Both competing firms place orders at time 0 without private information. Equilib-
rium order quantity for both firms is
b = 
2 + 
, where  =  + (1− )






II. (Renegotiation-Proofness) At time E, both firms have a chance to acquire real
demand information. Since both firms have the opportunities to revise order quantity
with the supplier, the supplier’s expected profit in equilibrium after time E are related
to [
[0]
 ] ≤[[[]  [[] ]]10. Since renegotiation after time E cannot be
prevented, b is not subgame-perfect equilibrium and order at time 0 is not credible.
In our model, because it is not robust against renegotiation after acquiring demand
information, the supplier’s expected sales quantity and profit are no longer subgame-
perfect equilibrium11. In other words, profit maximizing supplier has no reason to
accept order before time E. Hence, from now on, we assume that the feasible set of
timing of the order is from time E (Earliest) to time L (Latest), as seen in Figure 1.
1.4.2 Analysis of Information symmetry
Consider the case of information symmetry: either both firms have market demand
information, or none has this information. In either case, the only equilibrium with
the complete information game is to place orders simultaneously at time E since both
players’ best responses are always ordering at time E regardless of the competitor’s
order timing. Thus, the optimal order quantity ends up with simultaneous (Cournot
type) equilibrium point, and optimal order timing is at time E. As it is a trivial
10[
[]
 ] refers the supplier’s expected profit of sequential order, and [
[]
 ] means that of
simultaneous order (Cournot).
11This result still hold in both constant and increasing wholesale price with respect to time, and
even in imperfect information model.
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question, the following lemma formalizes equilibrium order quantities and profits for
two players in the complete information model.
Lemma 2 (i) If both firms have market demand information,12 the only equilibrium
point of endogenous sequencing game follows simultaneous move (Cournot) game with
ordering at time E. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of two
informed firms are:
1 = 2 =
 − 
2 + 





1 = 2 =
 − 
2 + 





(ii) If both firms do not have market demand information, the only equilibrium point
of endogenous sequencing game still follows simultaneous move (Cournot) game with
ordering at time E. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of two
informed firms are:
1 = 2 =
− 
2 + 





12Even if two frms have imperfect information about demand, this still holds under the information
symmetry. Only parameters are changed.
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1.4.3 Analysis of Information asymmetry
Hence, the most challenging part in the Endogenous Sequencing Game (ESG)
is the case of having different demand information: one firm invests in information
acquisition, and the other firm does not - (I, NI) or (NI, I) in IAG, and it is one of
the main thrusts in this paper. In the case of information asymmetry, we analyze
the problem in the context of the elements of an organization structure (Anand &
Mendelson (1997)). There are three elements, who decides what (the decision rights),
who knows what (the information endowment) and what are the incentives of each
player. For example, the decision rights of the informed firm are when to order, how
much to order, and whether to reveal information. He has the market information
in terms of the information endowment. The incentives are to maximize his own
profits. Since our model does not have a fixed sequence of events in that each player’s
timing of ordering is endogenous, we can expect three kinds of scenarios regarding
timing of order, corresponding order quantity, and the information flows. The possible
outcomes are as follows:
Scenario 1. Both the informed and uninformed firms place orders simultaneously
at the same point in time (the supplier has no chance to leak order information).
Scenario 2. The informed firm places an order before the uninformed firm with
the supplier, knowing that the supplier might leak this order information to the unin-
formed firm, who in turn can use this to tailor his order for the market. The supplier
starts production with the informed firm’s purchase order. Then, the uninformed
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firm places an order with the supplier using the information disseminated from the
supplier.
Scenario 3. The uninformed firm places an order before the informed firm with
the supplier, knowing that the supplier might leak this order information to the
informed firm. The supplier starts production with the uninformed firm’s purchase
order. Then the informed firm places an order with the supplier, knowing that the
uninformed timing of order is earlier than him.
The first scenario can be explained as a simultaneous move (Cournot) game
with incomplete information. The second and third scenarios can be explained as
a sequential-move (Stackelberg) game. In the second scenario, the informed firm en-
ters the market first as a Stackelberg leader followed by the uninformed firm. Using
three scenarios, we will further analyze the firms’ profit maximizing order timing and
quantity in next section.
1.4.4 The Equilibriums in ESG
Consider payoff functions of the informed firm between scenario 1 and 2. The
informed firm faces the following options: If he places an order simultaneously with
the uninformed firm, there is no chance of information leakage from the supplier. But,
he cannot take first mover’s advantage. On the other hand, if the informed firm orders
earlier than the uninformed firm, he takes market leader’s advantage. However, he
faces the possibility of information leakage since he has revealed market information
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by early order.
The most important point in the informed firm’s perspective is that low type
informed firm always prefers to move earlier than uninformed firm by revealing his
demand information. It means that the low type informed firm strictly prefers to
take market leader’s advantage despite of the possibility of information leakage. By
comparison between first two scenarios, the low type informed firm’s payoff function
as a Stackelberg leader is always greater than first scenario with all parameter value
of 13.
The uninformed firm also faces following trade-off: allowing market leader’s ad-
vantage to the informed firm and taking market information, or none of these. The
main consideration is whether market follower’s disadvantage can be compensated
by information leaked from the supplier, if possible. Based on two scenarios, if he
places an order simultaneously with the informed firm at time E, he does not allow
the informed party to take market leader’s advantage. But, he cannot acquire real
market information. On the other hand, if he orders later than the informed firm,
he allows the competitor to take market leader’s advantage. However, he can get
realized market information by information leakage. In some region, we observe that
the uninformed firm prefers to be a follower in spite of second mover’s disadvantage,
13The substitute parameter () also affects the informed firm’s preference: the less substitutable
the products, the less the two markets overlap, and therefore the larger the effective size of the total
market (Roller & Tombak (1993), Singh & Vives (1984)). Thus, the lower substitute parameter,
the lower threshold of demand parameter () for the high type informed firm because of less degree
of competition. In addition, low type informed firm’s preference is not changed by . He always
prefers the sequential move regardless of the value .
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and it formalizes an essential building block for the Information Acquisition Game
(IAG).
In the endogenous sequencing game with incomplete information, the choice of
timing plays a role as an additional signal about the informed player’s demand in-
formation, although it is different from a quantity signal (Mailath (1993), Saloner
(1987).) Thus, the choice of order timing by the informed firm can convey demand
information in the endogenous move game. For instance, if a type of informed firm
places an order late, then the uninformed firm revises his strategy profile, in that no
early order is placed: No action is considered as an action. By appropriately speci-
fying each player’s belief structure captured in the previous section, we can examine
if each player’s deviation is profitable or not. Finally, we come to the equilibrium
timing of order and order quantity from three scenarios.
The following theorem formalizes the uninformed firm’s belief structure, proves
the existence of equilibrium in endogenous sequencing game (ESG) for all parameter
values, and derives the equilibrium.
Theorem 3 There are equilibrium points in Endogenous Sequencing Game (ESG)
for all , , and  are as follows.
Case I. A separating Perfect Baysian Nash Equilibrium exists:
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(i) The informed firm places order at time E. Order quantity is:
 =
(2− )
2(2− 2)  if demand is high, and
 =
½ (2−)
2(2−2) , when  ≥ 2+2−




 if demand is low
(ii) Supplier always leaks.
(iii) The uninformed firm orders at time L. Order quantity is:
 =
(4− 2 − 2)
4(2− 2)  if (
e = ) = 1
 =
½ (4−2−2)
4(2−2) , when  ≥ 2+2−




 if ( e = ) = 0
consistent with his beliefs that:
( e = ) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 if  =
(2−)
2(2−2) and the informed firm orders at time E
and the supplier leaks
0 if  =
© (2−)





, when  2+
2−
ª
and the informed firm orders at time E & the supplier leaks,
or, the supplier does not leak
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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(iv) The profits of the informed firm and the uninformed firm are as follows:
 =
(2− )22
8(2− 2) , if demand is high
 =
½ (2−)22
8(2−2) , when  ≥ 2+2−




, if demand is low.
 =
(4− 2 − 2)22
16(2− 2)2  if (
e = ) = 1
 =
½ (4−2−2)22
16(2−2)2 , when  ≥ 2+2−




 if ( e = ) = 0
Case II. When  ≤ 4−2+22·−22
(2−)2+4·−22 , a pooling equilibrium exists:




(ii) The supplier always leaks.




consistent with his beliefs that:
( e = ) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 if the supplier leaks and   
min
 , or the supplier does not leak;





















when demand is high, and
 =
(2 − )2






Under the sequential moves, the low type informed firm prefers to order at time
E, and its deviation is always not profitable. So, the uninformed firm believes that
the informed firm’s deviation from time E to time L can happen only in high demand
state. Thus, when the informed firm deviates, the uninformed firm, consequently, can
infer right after time E that market demand is high state. Thus, market information is
disseminated to the uninformed firm and the uninformed firm updates his priors: the
game is changed to Simultaneous move game with complete information ( e = ).
The informed firm’s profit for the deviation is strictly less than the profit of the early
order14. Also, uninformed firm’s deviation to time E is not profitable one.
Now suppose proposed equilibrium is scenario 1. Given informed firm’s action
(right after time E) - this means that the informed firm finished his order with sce-
nario 1 order quantity (the informed firm’s order quantity remain unchanged), the
uninformed firm can get market information, and he revises his belief structure. It
implies that his expected profit by deviation is always greater than ordering at time
14 (2−)22









E. Since the uninformed firm’s deviation is profitable, simultaneous order (scenario
1) fails to be an equilibrium outcome in ESG.
In the sequential move game, for the quantity choice  by the informed firm,
the uninformed firm infers that the state of demand is either  or . Since the
quantity choices by the informed firm are best responses, the order quantity has to
satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. When  is large (≥ 2+
2− ), the high and
low demand states are widely separated in that the penalty for the high type informed
firm to mimic the low type is quite large. However, when when   2+
2− , if the low
type informed firm were to order
(2−)
2(2−2) , the high type would prefer mimicking the
low type by ordering
(2−)
2(2−2) . So, if the low type informed firm wants to send a
credible signal, he needs to order sufficiently smaller than
(2−)
2(2−2) .
Even if the costly separating equilibrium is played, the equilibrium is the same
with previous analysis: the informed firm’s order at time E and the uninformed
firm’s order at time L. For example, the uninformed firm’s deviation from scenario 1
is profitable, and the informed firm’s deviation from scenario 2 is not profitable. It
implies that ex ante profit of the sequential move game is a dominant strategy for
both players as long as a credible signal is disseminated.
In addition to separating equilibrium, we might think about pooling equilibrium
for the sequential move game. In pooling equilibrium for the Stackelberg game, the
informed firm orders the same quantity from the supplier in both demand states.
In ESG, pooling equilibrium is also not dominated equilibrium. Given the informed
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firm’s output decision, the uninformed firm cannot gain by deviating from time L to
E. His best response to the informed firm’s order remains same with order at time L.
 3 has important implications in terms of timing of order. The extant
literature in operations management has investigated the ways to induce early order
( Cachon (2004); Liu & Ryzin (2008)). In all literature, inducing early order is a
challenging problem for the upstream firm. The down stream partner could be placed
to order either by providing discount of whole sale price (Cachon (2004); Dong & Zhu
(2007)), or by creating capacity constraints (Liu & Ryzin (2008), Su (2008)). In
contrast, by explicitly considering incentives in terms of timing of order, we have
shown that for the complete range of parameter values (, , and ), so long as one
firm has better information than the other the informed firm naturally orders earlier
than the uninformed party. Interestingly, in our model, the supplier can charge a
premium for the early ordering firm rather than providing lower wholesale price.
For a theoretical contribution, we first showed the relationship between market
demand information and timing of order endogenously, which was often assumed as
immovable sequence of events in the extant literature (Cvsa & Gilbert (2002))
- indeed the less informed firm is assumed to order late. This also generalizes the
results of Anand & Goyal (2009): We formally prove that their model is still hold
in the endogenous sequence of events. Further, we formally prove that the model
is robust to partial substitute model, while they considered only perfect substitutes.
The substitute parameter () affects firm’s preference, but our model shows on the
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equilibrium path that sequential move is still dominant strategy for both firms.
We also found that there is another sequential equilibrium in which the uninformed
firm moves first and all types of informed firm moves at time L. Given the uninformed
firm’s order, the informed firm cannot be profitable by deviating to time E. The
informed firm should have to order same quantity at time E, which does not change
his payoff. The uninformed firm’s deviation is also not profitable. He just lose the
first mover’s advantage by deviation15.
1.4.5 Value of information
We analyze Cournot model with complete and incomplete information to investi-
gate value of information: (i) when a firm has demand information and (ii) when a
firm has no demand information.16 Value of information is the difference of profits be-
tween above two cases. After simplification, value of information for the uninformed
firm is a function of , , and the gap between two demand intercept. When  is
decreased from 1, total value of information is increased as a quadratic fashion.
Total value of information =
(1− ) ( −)2
(2 + )2
There are two effects in the partial substitute market: first, when  (intensity of
competition) is decreased, total value of information is increased. Second, because two
15Normann (2002) found smilar results with us although the model is different from us. First, he
assumed full observability for both firms. Second, he uses specific case demand interval (  2).



















market sizes are increased with lower , total value of information is also increased.
To see pure (relative) value of information, each expected profit can be divided by
total profit of each market. This can be analyzed as follows.17
 [Profit of an informed firm]
Total profit of complete information game
−  [Profit of an uninformed firm]






(4− 4 − 2)2 + (2 + )2( ·2 + (1− )2)
Corollary 4 When  is decreased from 1, the uninformed firm is more likely to wait
for the informed firm information. The uninformed firm can take advantage of the
informed firm’s information when  is low. With the same , value of information
is maximized when demand uncertainty is highest ( = 05).
1.5 Information Acquisition Game (IAG)
In this section, we analyze the grand model of the paper - when information ac-
quisition is a choice variable for two competing firms. In the Information Acquisition
Game (IAG), two competing firms decide whether to acquire market information with
a fixed cost (). We assume that these decisions are common knowledge and observ-
able to each other. So, IAG in table 1 is represented as a 2 × 2 matrix form for
strategic game. Each firm is endowed with two strategies (Invest () and No Invest
()), and based on these decisions, the rest of events follow ESG.18
17When  = 0 or 1 (no uncertainty) and  = 0 (independent market), there is no pure value of
information.






with Complete Info.(E, E)
( − −)
Sequential order (E, L)
( −) 1
No Invest
Sequential order (L, E)
(  −)
Simultaneous order




Table 1.1: Information Acquisition Game (IAG)
The most important point in this section is the trade-off between information
acquisition cost and timing of order. If one firm invests in market information, he
takes advantage of market leader with incurred cost. For the uninformed firm, even
though he has market follower’s disadvantage, he can also acquire market information
by leakage, and revise his order quantity. In the information symmetry cases - if both
firms acquire or none do - the timing of orders are at time E for both firms, and the
simultaneous move game is played.
We seek a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 2× 2 matrix non-cooperative game.
As is the typical way of finding equilibrium path, the solution can be obtained by
considering the best response function of each firm given investment choice of his
competitor. Each firm’s best response depends on the value of information acquisition
cost . Let each firm’s distinction of two payoff functions 1 when competitor does
invest in information, and let each firm’s distinction of two payoff functions 2 when
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competitor does not invest. The following proposition derives equilibriums in IAG.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium in Information Acquisition Game is divided by 4
cases and as follows:
() When 0 ≤   min[1 2], (Invest, Invest) is the only equilibrium for two com-
petitors.
() When 1    2, (Invest, No Invest) and (No Invest, Invest) are equilibri-
ums.
() When 2    1, (Invest, Invest) and (No Invest, No Invest) are equilibri-
ums.
() When   max[12], (No Invest, No Invest) is the only equilibrium.
We explain the equilibriums in IAG with Figure 2, which illustrates possible equi-
libriums depending on 1and 2. The value of information can be measured by
the difference between two payoff functions: a firm has market information and a
firm does not have it. In the both monopoly and competition market, the value of
information is maximized when market uncertainty is highest ( = 05). Also, as
is expected, the value of information for monopoly case is higher than competitive
market because of the lack of competition and substitute goods (i.e. higher chance
to make more profit.) Thus, monopoly is more likely to invest in market information.
As the number of competitors are increased (two in figure 2), expected profit for each
firms is decreased, and there are less rooms to invest in information.19
19Figure 3 also explains the investment levels between two firms’ competition and that of three
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Figure 1.2: Equilibria of Information Acquisition Game
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In IAG, investment decision is a little different from pure value of information.
Basically, when  is increased, the market size is increased, and market leader’s ad-
vantage is also increased. Therefore, firms are more likely to invest in information.
For instance, in the area of (I, I) (NI, NI), there is a huge advantage as a leader
even though information acquisition cost is high. So, both firms do not allow market
leader’s advantage to the competitor. On the other hand, in the (I, NI), (NI, I) area,
advantage as a leader is not significant because information acquisition cost is not
ignorable. So, strategically, one firm does invest on it, but the other firm does not.
We call this area strategic substitute area.
In addition, we might think about the situation when two firms have different
information acquisition cost ( b  b). Different cost concept is applicable when
a firm has cheaper information acquisition cost by experiencing a relatively longer
history of sales data, and the other firm is newly entering the market. Depending
on the values of b and b , the firm’s investment strategy could be changed. As
seen in the following lemma, while information acquisition cost is increased, firms are
more likely not to invest in information.
Lemma 6 When two competitors have different information acquisition cost b,
b, equilibriums are in the following tables.
(i) 1 ≥ 2
firms in IAG. Investment level for three firms game is less than two firms’s game.
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b  1 (NI, I) (NI, I) (NI, NI)
Firm I 2  b  1 (I, I) (I, I), (NI, NI) (I, NI)b  2 (I, I) (I, I) (I, NI)b  2 2  b  1 b  1
Firm II
(i) 2  1
b  2 (NI, I) (NI, I) (NI, NI)
Firm I 1  b  2 (NI, I) (I, NI), (NI, I) (I, NI)b  1 (I, I) (I, NI) (I, NI)b  1 1  b  2 b  2
Firm II
We also generalized our result with the multiple player game. We generalize our
result with the multiple player game. Suppose there are a total of + firms, and 
firms invest in information and  firms are uninformed.20 Thus, the informed firms
place orders with the supplier at time E, and uninformed firms place orders at time
L.
Lemma 7 (i) In the n+m player game with n informed firms and m uninformed
firms, when all players orders at time E, the game is simultaneous move (Cournot)
game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of n informed firms
and m uninformed firms are:


































where  = {1 2  } and  = {1 2 }
(ii) In the n+m player game with n informed firms and m uninformed firms, if the
informed firms orders before the uninformed firms, and if the supplier commits to leak
order information with uninformed firms, the game is sequential move (Stackelberg)
game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of n informed firms

























where  = {1 2  } and  = {1 2 }
For the illustration purpose, we analyze three player’s information acquisition
game in the multiple player IAG. Upon information acquisition decision, three com-
petitors can have demand information with cost of, and each firm faces the following
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Table 1.2: Possible outcomes in Three player Information Acquisition Game (IAG)
six cases of outcomes and each player’s expected payoffs are as follows.
In the three-player game, upon information acquisition decision, three competitors
can have demand information with cost of , and each firm faces the six cases of
outcomes. Figure 3 (a) illustrates possible equilibria depending on 12 and
3.
21 The result has a similar pattern with two player game. First, when 0 ≤  
min[1 2 3], (I, I, I) is the only equilibrium for three players. When 2   
min[1 3], (I, I, I), (I, NI, NI), (NI, I, NI), and (NI, NI, I) are equilibria. When
2  1    3, (I, NI, NI), (NI, I, NI), and (NI, NI, I) are equilibria. When
3    1, (I, I, I) and (NI, NI, NI) are equilibria. When   max[1 2 3],
(NI, NI, NI) is the only equilibrium. The second graph in Figure 3 illustrates the
difference between a two-player and three-player game. Interestingly, in the multiple
player game, there is an area that only one firm does invest on information. More
than one firms’ investment, for example, (I,I,NI), is never an equilibrium.
Information Acquisition Game has the following implications. First, when demand
21Let each firm’s difference of payoff function 1 when all competitors do invest in , and let each
firm’s difference of payoff function 2 when one of two competitors invests. 3 represents firm’s
difference of payoff function when none invests.
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: 3 player game
: 2 player game
Figure 1.3: Equilibria of Multiple Player Game
interval  (= 

) is increased, value of information is increased. Thus, firms are more
likely to invest in market information. Second, due to the effect of competition, firms
investment decisions are different from pure value of information. Where the market
size is increased - for example,  is close to 1, firms are more likely to invest in the
information not to allow huge market leader’s advantage. Third, also due to the effect
of competition, firms are less likely to invest in information when the number of firms
in the market are increased. We understand it as expected market share effect for
each firm : When the number of firms are increased, the expected market share and




We study the behavior of each firms investment decision numerically in this sec-
tion. Figure 4 (a) describes firms’ investment decision behaviors in different gaps
between  and . When  (=


) is small or zero, both firms are not going to
invest in information due to the small value of information. When  is increased, the
value of information is also increased, and therefore investment area ((I, I), (I, NI),
(NI, I)) is increased. However, even if  is increased, there is an area that not all
firms invest in information. It is a strategic substitute area in our model. When  is
increased (x-axis), then (I, I) and (NI, NI) area is increased. This is because firms
have more probability to make profit by high probability of high demand. Thus,
firms are more likely to pay on information acquisition. Figure 4 (b)∼(d) illustrate
firms’ behavior in different information acquisition cost and demand uncertainty. For
 = 40 (figure 4(b)), (NI, NI) is an equilibrium when  = 01. When  = 02, (I, NI)
or (NI, I) is equilibriums. And,  is increased, (I, I) or (NI, NI) is equilibrium. For
 = 60 (figure 4(c)), (NI, NI) is an equilibrium when  = 02. When  = 045, (I,
NI) or (NI, I) is equilibriums. As  is increased, firms do not invest in most cases.















(a) Different equilibria depending on AH/AL
Figure 1.4: Investment decision behavior with different demand variety and cost .
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1.6 Conclusion
We prove that when one firm acquires market information, the informed firm
always places an order early. In fact, the uninformed firm strictly prefers to order
late after the informed firm. This result is interesting for the following reasons:
() Extant literature has highlighted benefits for the downstream firms to order
early (cf. Cachon, 2004; Dong & Zhu, 2007), which range from better capacity
planning by the supplier to getting demand information earlier. However, in all of
extant literature, inducing the retailer to order early is a challenge. The retailer
can be made to order early either by the lure of a lower wholesale price or by the
threat of capacity constraints (cf. Liu & Ryzin, 2008; Su, 2008). However, we prove
that as long as one firm is better informed than the other, the better informed firm
automatically orders early. In fact, far from charging a lower wholesale price to induce
early ordering, the supplier can in fact charge a premium.
() From a more theoretical perspective, we generalize the results of Anand and
Goyal (2009) in three ways: () The sequence of moves that was exogenously imposed
in Anand and Goyal (2009) emerges endogenously — the better informed firm indeed
orders early. () While they considered perfect substitutes, we extend their results
to products that may be partial substitutes. () While they allowed only one firm
to acquire information, both firms in our model can do so. We show that, consistent
with practice, not all firms are equally informed even within the same industry.
Our results on endogenous sequencing (where the informed firm orders early) are
43
robust to (i) when the firms are imperfectly informed — all that is needed is one firm
to be better informed than the other. (ii) multiple demand states and/or multiple
players, and (iii) endogenous wholesale price.
Further, we analyzed the imperfect information with information evolution as a
extensive research. It is natural that firms have imperfect information in the earlier
period, and this imprecision can be resolved in the later period. In this model, we
found two important equilibriums which has quite meaningful managerial implication.
First case is that the informed firm still places order early in spite of certain degree
of noise for the demand information. We confirm that the base model is still hold as
long as imprecision factor of the informed firm is greater than certain threshold value.
Even if the informed firm can have better information later, market leader advantage
is still dominant in the competition model. Second equilibrium is when the informed
firm places order late allowing market leader advantage to the uninformed firm. These








More accurate market demand information has a strong relationship with firm’s
success in the selling season. Enterprises across all industries and market segments
invest large percentages of their budgets in information systems and market research
to improve accuracy in forecasting demand. However, due to fairly longer production
and delivery lead time, it is more difficult to estimate accurate market demand infor-
mation well in advance of the selling season. In reality, firms can usually have more
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accurate market demand information near the selling season by acquiring market in-
formation from more diverse resources. So, it is natural that firms have inaccurate
market information in the earlier period, and that imprecision can be resolved in near
the selling season. One of limitations from previous model is that the informed firm
has perfect market information by default throughout the feasible time horizon.
In this chapter, we explorer the imperfect information and information evolution
model as an extensive research. In imperfect information model, the informed firm
has better information than the uninformed firm, but the informed firm has certain
degree of noise. This base model is extended with information evolution concept.
With information evolution model, two firms have different imprecision factors (for
example, 1, 2) with early period, and its information evolution slopes (information
exploitation) as time goes to the selling season are also different. We investigate
equilibrium outcomes of Endogenous Sequencing Game with this setting.
Research questions are as follows. ()What are the equilibrium timing and quan-
tity of order for two competing firm when the informed firm’s demand information
also has a certain degree of noise? How could the equilibrium solution be changed
compared to previous chapter’s result? () Firms can acquire more accurate picture
of demand, if they delays orders. What is the best timing of order and quantity for
two competing firm in endogenous sequencing game? How firms’ profit functions are
changed by different information evolution slope? We compare every possible scenario
for three risk-neutral supply chain participants (a single supplier and two competing
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firms).
We found two important equilibriums which has quite meaningful managerial im-
plication. First case is that the informed firm still places order early in spite of certain
degree of noise in market demand information. We confirm that the base model is still
hold as long as imprecision factor of the early ordering informed firm is greater than
certain threshold level of ∗. Even if the informed firm can have better information
later, market leader’s advantage is still dominant than information acquisition effect
by ordering late in the competition model. Second case is when the informed firm
places order late allowing market leader’s advantage to the uninformed firm. These
two equilibria imply that optimal timing of order has a important relationship with
information evolution slope. When the slope is quite steep during ordering period, the
informed firm can delay orders until this imprecision is cleared. On the other hand,
when the quality of information is gradually improved, the informed firm places or-
der as early as possible in spite of some degree of noise. In addition, we analyze
the supplier’s preference between two equilibrium. Assuming that the supplier’s pro-
duction cost is directly proportional to time, we found that the supplier prefers one
equilibrium than the other strictly.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present models with
imperfect information and information evolution. In section 3, we analyze imperfect
information game and its equilibrium point. Section 4 investigates information evo-




We consider the imperfect and information evolution model and its impact on
competition on procurement and the timing of events by analyzing a supply chain
consisting of one supplier and two horizontally competing firms. The two firms
produce a seasonal product, which are perfect substitutes for the ease of analysis.
We assume that the demand curve is linear and downward-sloping, with an uncer-
tain intercept e. The inverse demand curve for product  is linear of the form:
(3−) = e−−3−, where  is the quantity put in the market for product .
The demand intercept e is random and can take one of two values: a high value 
with probability , and low value  with probability (1−); these values are common
knowledge. We refer to the parameter  ∈ (1
2
 1] as an imprecision parameter, where
it indicates the accuracy of belief: the informed firm has some belief what demand is,
but does not know it exactly. We further assume that  is common knowledge. When
 = 1 it is the perfect information game - the same model with ESG in previous
section. Base model of this chapter analyzes that this imprecision parameter is not
changed. We call this Imperfect Information Game (ESG-IIG) However, we further
consider the case that  is cleared at time L. We call this Information Evolution Game
(ESG-IEG). Thus, In IEG, if the informed firm waits until time L, he observes the
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(a)  Imperfect Information Game (ESG-IIG) (b) Information Evolution Game (ESG-IIG)
Figure 2.1: Time line of Events and Information Structure of Models.
chapter. The two firms source their product (or a key component) from a common
supplier. The lead time for delivering orders is . Hence, if  marks the start of the
selling season, then the latest time to place an order with the supplier is  time units
before  We denote this time epoch by . Thus, We also assume that there are no
capacity constraints.
Once the selling season begins, demand uncertainty is resolved by default. The
informed firm can acquire market information early (at time E) by various market
research activities. Since it is quite well in advance of the selling season, and there are
quite limited resources to get high quality market information. Thus, the informed
firm’s market information is not perfect market information. In the extension section,
we further assume that this imprecision is resolved at near the selling season (at time
L). So, we restrict the time horizon of analysis into [] in this paper.
The sequence of event is as follows. Both the informed and uninformed firm have
two option of ordering either at time E or time L, knowing that the supplier might
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leak order information to the competitor, who can revise this order information for
his order for the market. This decision is made before time E for both firms. The
supplier then delivers the products before the start of the selling season. Demand
and profits are realized at time 
Additional feature of the model in this chapter is that we impose realistic infor-
mation structure - No firm has a perfect market information well in advance of the
selling season (time E), and this information can be realized at near the selling season
(in the extension part) - without changing endogenous sequence of events. We mainly
analyze the information structure of incomplete information where only one firm is
informed with noisy signal. We still assume that uninformed firm has the only gen-
eral market information throughout the time horizon. The appropriate equilibrium
concept for the dynamic game of incomplete information is the Perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium.
The equilibrium in our model has three components which are intertwined with
each other: () Information flows (from information acquisition to information dis-
semination in the supply chain) () Material flows (the order quantities of the two
suppliers), and () Timing of orders.
2.3 Imperfect Information Game (ESG-IIG)
Suppose the informed firm has some belief as to what demand is - but does not
know it exactly. For this setting, we introduce imprecision factor  (1
2
   1)
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where Pr( =    = ) = Pr( =    = ) = . It means
that the informed firm knows true demand with a noise factor . Consequently,
Pr( =    = ) = Pr( =    = ) = 1 − . Using
Baye’s rule, Pr( =  = ) =

+(1−)(1−) , Pr( =  =
) =
(1−)(1−)
+(1−)(1−) , Pr( =  = ) =
(1−)
(1−)+(1−) , and Pr( =
 = ) =
(1−)
(1−)+(1−) . Thus, the high type informed firm’s expected
profit, for example, is formulated as follows:
 [ ] = Pr( =  = )[(−−) ]+Pr( =  = )[(−−) ]
The following lemma explains equilibrium solution of both simultaneous and sequen-
tial move game for imperfect information. Detailed proof are provided in appendix.
Lemma 8 () The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit for the si-
multaneous move game for imperfect information model are:
 =





( + (1− )(1− )))









((1− ) + (1− )))







 [ ] =
µ
( + (1− )(1− )))






((1− ) + (1− )))








() The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit for the sequential move
game for imperfect information model are:
 =
 + (1− )(1− )
2(+ (1− )(1− ) ,  =
(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))
 =
 + (1− )(1− )
4(+ (1− )(1− ) ,  =
(1− ) + (1− )
4((1− ) + (1− ))




 + (1− )(1− )
(+ (1− )(1− )
¶2




(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))
¶2




 + (1− )(1− )
(+ (1− )(1− )
¶2




(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))
¶2
2.3.1 Analysis of Imperfect Information Game
Our model has endogenous sequence of moves for two players, equilibrium points
have 1. Timing of order, 2. Material flows, and 3. Information flows. The difference
from previous chapter is whether the informed firm still reveal noisy signal, and the
uninformed firm delay his order for more accurate but not perfect market information.
The supplier also has decision right whether to leak this noisy signal or not. Thus, IIG
is also comprised with three types of scenarios: 1. Simultaneous order, 2. Informed
firm’s order at time E and uninformed firm’s order at time L, and 3. Uninformed
firm’s order at time E and the informed firm’s order at time L. The first scenario can
52
be explained by first part of above lemma, and the second scenario can be explained
by second part.
Each player’s preference has similar pattern with previous chapter (only parameter
is changed), and it can be summarized as follows. As long as imprecision factor () is
greater than half, low type informed firm always prefers sequential order by ordering
at time E. Some of high type informed firm prefers to order simultaneously at time L.
The uninformed firm prefers sequential order by ordering at time L, and as compared




exists the uninformed firm’s preference of sequential order.
2.3.2 Equilibrium of Imperfect Information Game
We analyze whether three feasible timing of orders are sustained as an equilibrium
outcome in the imperfect information environment. By appropriately specified each
player’s belief structure captured in the previous section, we examine if each player’s
deviation is profitable or not. Also, we come up with the equilibrium timing of order
and the volume of order from three possible scenarios.
Supplier’s leakage decision
Followed by same procedure from previous chapter’s analysis, the supplier’s leak-
age decision can be analyzed in case of imperfect information model. In the high
demand state, profit maximizing supplier’s strategy is to leak informed firm’s informa-
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tion to the uninformed firm. Selling quantity for sequential move (
3+(1−)(1−)
4(+(1−)(1−) )






low demand state, the supplier will not leak the informed firm’s ordering directly to












4((1−)+(1−)) ). Since it is the only case when the supplier will not leak directly,
the uninformed firm will infer that demand state is low. Therefore, previous chapter’s
result is still hold in the imperfect information case.
Corollary 9 Even if the informed firm’s market information has certain degree of
noisy signal, the supplier will always leak order information to the uninformed firm.
The key consideration for the equilibrium analysis is that even if the informed
firm has an imperfect signal at the start of a period, market leader’s advantage is
still dominant as long as the informed firm has better information (  1
2
) than the
uninformed firm. For example, when real demand is low, the low type informed firm’s
best action is to reveal his demand information into the uninformed firm to convey
information at any time. In other words, the low type informed firm should always
places order early even when demand is low with noise. This is still hold whenever the
uninformed firm places order. On the other hand, the informed firm might not order
when demand is high with high uncertainty. However, the uninformed firm will infer
that it is high demand state based on his belief structure if the informed firm does not
order early. So, the game is changed to simultaneous move game with complete infor-
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. So, we conclude that the informed firm always places order at time E.
The uninformed firm also consider following trade-off: simultaneous order at time
E without acquiring market information and ordering at time L allowing market
leader’s advantage to the informed firm. Instead, by ordering at time L, the unin-
formed firm can acquire market information with certain degree of noise. Other pro-
cedures are same with perfect information game - The uninformed firm’s deviation
from ordering at time E is profitable, but his deviation from time L is not profitable.
The intuition behind the argument is as follows: even though the value of informa-
tion by ordering at time L for the uninformed firm is less than perfect information
game, there is still information gap between two firms, and it plays a role conforming
equilibrium. We found that as long as imprecision parameter is greater than half,
previous chapter’s Endogenous Sequencing Game is still holds, and sequential move
game is still dominant for both firms.
Proposition 10 In the imperfect information game with certain imprecision para-
meter there is only equilibrium for all ,  and , and is as follows.
(i) The informed firm places order early. Order quantity is:
 =
 + (1− )(1− )
2(+ (1− )(1− )  if demand is high, and
 =
(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))  if demand is low
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(ii) Supplier leaks information both direct and indirect way.
(iii) The uninformed firm orders
 =
 + (1− )(1− )
4(+ (1− )(1− )  if (
e = ) = 1
 =
(1− ) + (1− )
4((1− ) + (1− ))  if (
e = ) = 0
consistent with his beliefs that:
( e = ) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 if  =
+(1−)(1−)
2(+(1−)(1−)
and the informed firm orders early and the supplier leaks
0 if  =
(1−)+(1−)
2((1−)+(1−))
and the informed firm orders early and the supplier leaks,
or, the supplier does not leak
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(iv) The profits of the informed firm and the uninformed firm are as follows:




 + (1− )(1− )
(+ (1− )(1− )
¶2





(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))
¶2
, if demand is low.




 + (1− )(1− )
(+ (1− )(1− )
¶2





(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))
¶2
 if ( e = ) = 0
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2.4 Information Evolution Game (ESG-IEG)
Suppose early ordering informed firm has very noisy signal about the demand (
is slightly greater than 0.5). In that period, if the informed firm waits, he can get a
more accurate picture of demand. If he waits until ‘’, then he will know demand
with certainty. However, the informed firm has to trade-off waiting with the fact
that waiting might cause him to act as a follower against the uninformed firm. If the
uninformed firm waits, he cannot acquire more accurate signal of demand: recall that
the uninformed firm can only acquires demand information by observable delay after
the informed firm’s order. But, if the uninformed firm places an order at time E, he
might take market leader’s advantage in case of late order from the informed firm.
The key fact in this setting is whether the low type informed firm still always
prefers to order at time E. If he still prefers, the equilibrium path is similar pattern
with previous results. If not, the uninformed firm cannot revise his belief structure
when the informed firm delays his order. If the informed firm places order at time
L with the uninformed firm, the uninformed firm cannot guarantee that demand is
high state (therefore, simultaneous move game with incomplete information is played
in this case).
For the simplicity, we assume that this signal become accurate when selling season
is coming, and finally this imprecision is cleared at time L ( = 1). Also, for the
simplicity of the model and to see pure effect of information evolution, we further
assume that the uninformed firm has a perfectly noisy signal ( = 05) throughout
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the time horizon [].
Lemma 11 () If the informed firm places an order at time E in Information Evo-
lution Game (IEG), the games still follow lemma 1 of Imperfect Information Game
(IIG). Cleared imprecision factor () does not affect the games of early ordering in-
formed firm.
() If both the informed firm and the uninformed firm place orders at time L, the
game is simultaneous move game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity of










and expected profit of both firms are:
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() If the uninformed firm orders before the informed firm, the game is sequential
move (Stackelberg) game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit
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and expected profit of both firms are:
 [ ] =







(1− ) (1− )






















In this section, we analyze if all feasible timing of orders are sustained as an
equilibrium in the Information Evolution Game. By appropriately specified belief
structure from each firm’s trade-offs, we examine whether each player’s one shot
deviation is profitable or not. Since the only equilibrium of IIG is the informed firm’s
order at time E and the uninformed firm’s order at time L (E, L), we start from (E,
L) model as a proposed equilibrium and verify whether each player’s deviation is
profitable.
2.4.1 The informed firm’s Early order, and the uninformed
firm’s Late order : (E, L)
First, we analyze the informed firm’s preference in timing of order. In the base
model, low type informed firm always prefers to order at time E. However, in the
information evolution model, it is not. There is a threshold ∗ where the low type
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informed firm also prefers to order at time L as well as high type informed firm. The
threshold ∗ can be estimated by comparing between the expected profit of low type
informed firm’s order at time E and expected profit of order at time L. Thus, when





(1− ) + (1− )
















For example, when  = 30  = 10  = 05, threshold 
∗is 0.87, and when
 = 50  = 10  = 05, threshold 
∗is 0.95. Thus, when  ≥ ∗ and the informed
firm deviated from time E to L, the uninformed firm revises his belief structure, and
he infers that it is high demand state. Then, the game is changed to complete in-
formation game. However, if  ≤ ∗, the uninformed firm cannot revises his belief
structure because both high and low type informed firm prefers to order late. Finally,
the informed firm’s deviation is profitable with low . Therefore, we conclude that
with threshold value of ∗ the informed firm still places order early at every time,
and the below of threshold value enables the informed firm to deviate to time L. In
addition, the uninformed firm’s deviation from time L to E is no profitable deviation
with same procedure in base model since the uninformed firm couldn’t get any valu-
able information by deviation. We conclude that (E, L) equilibrium is hold when ∗
is greater than threshold value. Otherwise, it is not an equilibrium.
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Corollary 12 With threshold value of information imprecision factor , sequential
move game is still hold for two firms. threshold value ∗ is the point where low type
informed firm always prefers to place order at time E.
2.4.2 The informed firm’s Late order, and the uninformed
firm’s Late order : (L, L)
In the previous section, the informed firm does place order early when  ≥ ∗.
But, when   ∗, the informed firm’s deviation is profitable. In this part, we verify
that whether both firms’ order at time L is another equilibrium or not. If both
firms place order at time L, it is simultaneous move game with perfect information.
Expected profit for both firms are
 [ ] =







(1− ) (1− )






















It is easy to verify that the uninformed firm’s deviation from ‘Late’ to ‘Early’ is
always profitable. When the uninformed firm deviates from time L to E, his optimal
order quantity is 
2
(as a Stackelberg leader), and expected profit is 
2
8
as long as the




). Therefore, it is not an equilibrium.
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2.4.3 The informed firm’s Late order, and the uninformed
firm’s Early order : (L, E)
When the uninformed firm place order at time E and the informed firm orders at
time L, expected profit for both firms are
 [ ] =







(1− ) (1− )






















With low  which is less than ∗, the informed firm’s deviation from time L to E
is never profitable. If the informed firm deviates, both high and low type informed
firm’s objective functions are
 [ ] = Pr( =  = )[( −  − 
2
) ] + Pr( =  = )[( −  − 
2
) ]
 [] = Pr( =  = )[( −  − 
2
)] + Pr( =  = )[( −  − 
2
) ]
and optimal order quantity and profits are
 =
( + (1− )(1− )))




((1− ) + (1− )))
2((1− ) + (1− )) −

4
 [ ] =
µ
( + (1− )(1− )))






((1− ) + (1− )))





and it is strictly less than initial profits. It means that he does not allow market
leader’s advantage to the uninformed firm, but he cannot acquire clear market infor-
mation. Thus, the informed firm’s deviation is not profitable. Also, the uninformed
firm’s deviation is never profitable. Since the uninformed firm cannot take any benefit
from delaying ordering, he just lose market leader’s advantage. When the uninformed
firm deviates from time E to L, the game becomes simultaneous move with incomplete
information. Expected profit for the uninformed firm is 
2
9
which is strictly less than
initial profit. Therefore, we conclude that (L, E) is an equilibrium when imprecision
factor  is strictly less than threshold value ∗.
2.4.4 The informed firm’s Early order, and the uninformed
firm’s Early order : (E, E)
It is easy to confirm that the uninformed firm will deviate from time E to L as
long as two conditions are hold: ()the informed firm has better information than
uninformed firm, and () the informed firm places order at time E. Suppose the
informed firm has better information and he places order early. The uninformed
firm’s deviation from ‘Early’ to ‘Late’ is always profitable. Initial profit for the both


















If the uninformed firm deviates from ‘Early’ to ‘Late’, his objective functions are
 [ ] = Pr( =  = )[( − ∗ − ) ]
+Pr( =  = )[( − ∗ − ) ]
 [] = Pr( =  = )[( − ∗ − )]





 are the informed firm’s optimal order quantity for simultaneous
move game) and optimal order quantity and profits for the uninformed firm after
deviation are
 =
3(Pr( =  = ) · +Pr( =  = ) ·) + 
12
 =
3(Pr( =  = ) · +Pr( =  = ) ·) + 
12
 [ ] =
µ





3(Pr( =  = ) · +Pr( =  = ) ·) + 
12
¶2
Expected profit  · [ ]+(1−) [] is always greater than initial . Therefore,
it is an profitable deviation, and (E, E) is not an equilibrium.
In sum, we conclude that there are two possible equilibriums depending on im-
precision factor , and are as follows.
Proposition 13 With threshold value ∗ where low type informed firm always prefers
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(1− ) + (1− )
















there are two equilibriums for all ,  and , and are as follows.
Case (i) When  ≥ ∗
(i) The informed firm places order early. Order quantity is:
 =
 + (1− )(1− )
2(+ (1− )(1− )  if demand is high, and
 =
(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))  if demand is low
(ii) Supplier leaks information both direct and indirect way.
(iii) The uninformed firm orders
 =
 + (1− )(1− )
4(+ (1− )(1− )  if (
e = ) = 1
 =
(1− ) + (1− )
4((1− ) + (1− ))  if (
e = ) = 0
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consistent with his beliefs that:
( e = ) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 if  =
+(1−)(1−)
2(+(1−)(1−)
and the informed firm orders early and the supplier leaks
1 if the informed firm does not place order at time E
0 if  =
(1−)+(1−)
2((1−)+(1−))
and the informed firm orders early and the supplier leaks,
or, the supplier does not leak
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(iv) The profits of the informed firm and the uninformed firm are as follows:




 + (1− )(1− )
(+ (1− )(1− )
¶2





(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))
¶2
, if demand is low.




 + (1− )(1− )
(+ (1− )(1− )
¶2





(1− ) + (1− )
2((1− ) + (1− ))
¶2
 if ( e = ) = 0
Case (ii) When   ∗






















Figure 2.2: Two Equilibria in Information Evolution Game
(iii) The informed firm orders
 =
( + (1− )(1− )))
2(+ (1− ) (1− )) −

4
, if demand signal is high
 =
((1− ) + (1− )))
2((1− ) + (1− )) −

4
, if demand signal is low






( + (1− )(1− )))




, if demand signal is high
 =
µ
((1− ) + (1− )))


















*( , , )p w 
Figure 2.3: The relationship between evolution of market information and the sup-
plier’s production cost.
2.5 Supplier’s preference about two equilibria
Suppose that the supplier can choose opening up and closing point of ordering,
and let this time window []. Also, suppose that the supplier’s production cost is
minimum with the order at time E, and it is increased and maximum with the order
at time L. Also suppose that at time E, the informed firm’s   ∗, and  is reached
to ∗ and time ∗, and finally it is one at time L. Suppose the supplier’s wholesale
price is , and the cost of production for the earliest ordering is , and production
cost of the timing at ∗ is  + 1, and that of time L is  + 2 (1  2). Figure 2
illustrates the relationship among time horizon, evolution of market information, and
the supplier’s production cost.
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Without any kind of private demand information for the supplier, his expected
profit for the first equilibrium (the informed firm’s order at time ∗, the uninformed
firm’s order at time L) is
[1] = [Expected order quantity for the informed firm at time 
∗]( − (+ 1))
+[Expected order quantity for the uninformed firm at time L]( − (+ 2))
The supplier’s expected profit for the second equilibrium (the informed firm’s order
at time L, the uninformed firm’s order at time E) is
[2] = [Expected order quantity for the uninformed firm at time ]( − )
+[Expected order quantity for the informed firm at time E]( − (+ 2))
After simplification, expected profit of second equilibrium ([2]) is always greater
than first equilibrium ([1]). Its difference is minimized at  = 0, and maximized




( +)( − − 1) + 1
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4
( +) · 1 − 1
8





( +) · 1
which is always positive number regardless of any other variables. Therefore, the
supplier prefers to accept order at time E.
2.6 Discussion / Conclusion
In this chapter, we prove that informed firm’s early order is robust to imperfect
information, and even certain condition of information evolution setting. Consistent
with practice, firms can usually have more accurate market demand information near
the selling season by acquiring market information from more diverse resources. So,
it is natural that firms have inaccurate market information in the earlier period, and
that imprecision can be resolved in near the selling season. One of limitations from
previous model is that the informed firm has perfect market information by default
throughout the feasible time horizon. Our results on endogenous sequencing where the
informed firm orders early are robust to () when the firms are imperfectly informed
- all that is needed is one firm to be better informed than the other, and () when
the early acquired information has better quality of signal than threshold level even
if this information is evolving.
Another interesting finding is the case that the uninformed firm orders early and
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the informed firm orders late with information evolution. When the informed firm has
low quality of signal, he allows market leader’s advantage to the uninformed firm and
waits for more accurate market information. Thus, there is a trade-off between market
leader’s advantage and more accurate signal. The informed firm has more benefit
from cleared information, and the uninformed firm has leader’s advantage. This also
holds the reverse case. The informed firm has market leader’s advantage, and the
uninformed firm has better demand information by observable delay. Surprisingly, we
found that simultaneous move game is never formalizing equilibrium in endogenous
sequencing game in various information structures.
In Operations Management research, all extant literature to induce early order
had to have either create incentive or risk (carrot or stick). However, we show that
much simple mechanism to induce early order in supply chain as long as one firm is
better informed than the other.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Management in New
Product Innovation and Process
Improvement
3.1 Introduction
The trade-off between firm’s efficiency and creativity (also called productivity
dilemma) has long been discussed in the business context. Abernathy (1978) first
suggested that a firm’s ability to compete over time was rooted not only in increasing
efficiency, but also in its ability to be simultaneously innovative. In both operations
and strategic management research, balancing between exploration and exploitation
has been a consistent theme for more than 30 years after Abernathy’s arguments. Not
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only in academic area, but also in industry practice, whether to focus on efficiency or
creativity is one of the most important and difficult decisions for the top management.
Recent industry example - Struggle between creativity and efficiency (Business Week
(2007)) - illustrates how process management affects firm’s ability in new product
innovation. 3M has built a reputation for being an outstanding corporate innovator
over its 100-plus-year history. However, after importing company-wide process man-
agement (Six Sigma) program by new CEO in early 2000, the company’s reputation
as an innovator has been sliding1. However, to the best of knowledge, there was no
clear cut answer with analytical modeling approach explaining this issue. Thus, in
this paper, we develop analytical models to explain productivity dilemma issue. We
mainly analyze the relationship between process management and different type of
new product innovation using extreme value theory with generalized cost function in
innovation, focusing on how innovation performance and process management affect
firm’s optimal investment decision and the market equilibrium outcome. Although
there are some other qualitative issues which are hard to be in line with the mathe-
matical modeling framework, we build a stylized modeling approach considering some
of important factors such as innovation characteristics of product and competition.
In spite of consistent debates among industry practitioners about productivity
dilemma, less attention has been given in analytical approach of Operations Man-
agement area. Also, there has been limited formal academic research on whether
1In 2004, 3M was ranked No.1 on Boston consulting Group’s most innovative companies list. It
dropped No. 2 in 2005, No. 3 in 2006, No. 7 in 2007, No. 22 in 2008, No. 41 in 2009, and not
ranked (NR) in 2010.
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the trade-off between process management and innovation is inevitable. Benner &
Tushman (2003) shows seminal work with an empirical approach that process man-
agement will promote more incremental innovation, but it will decreases blue-sky
innovation. They show that process management activities must be buffered from
exploratory activities and that ambidextrous forms provide the complex context for
these inconsistent activities to coexist. This phenomenon is further claimed by Ruffa
(2009), describing a related approach known as lean dynamics. Lean dynamics takes
a different approach from lean manufacturing: it does not directly target the desired
outcome of waste elimination. i.e. zero defects. Instead, it promotes a different way
of structuring the business that creates an inherent “dynamic and optimal stability”
of firm. Both Benner & Tushman (2003) and Ruffa (2009) are supported by interview
of Arthur Fry, inventor of the Post-it note and a more than 30 years of 3M scientist,
with BusinessWeek. We take note of his argument: “Innovation is a numbers game.
You have to go through 5,000 to 6,000 raw ideas to find one successful business. Six
Sigma asks to eliminate all that waste at the first time and just come up with the right
idea .”
Process management, first introduced by Deming (1986), became popular as a
central element of quality management, and these practices have been continued as
ISO 9000, and Six Sigma recently. A large number of organization have adopted
process management practices to improve quality and ultimately reduce cost. While
Process Management’s contribution to improve manufacturing efficiency is widely
74
demonstrated (ex. 3M’s short term profit increase), it has led not only to excellence
in operations but also affect to adjacent process for selecting and developing techno-
logical innovations (Brown & Duguid (2000)). As variation decreasing and efficiency
oriented focus of process management spread to core of innovation, or variation cre-
ating activities, it’s effect also migrates firm’s capability of creativity. For instance,
Benner & Tushman (2002) empirically shows that after applying process manage-
ment, firm’s number of patent of incremental innovation (by citing prior patent) is
increased whereas that of radical innovation (no prior patent) is sharply decreased.
While process management demands precision and consistency, innovation calls
for variation and serendipity. Different from process management, firm’s innovation
structure depends on it’s profit extremes. Dahan & Mendelson (2001) first introduces
three types innovation projects using extreme value distribution in New Product De-
velopment (NPD). They classify innovation along proximity to the current techno-
logical trajectory on the technological dimension. A firm undertakes multiple R&D
projects, and choose a project with highest performance. A key theorem in extreme
value distribution states that when the distribution of the maximum of multiple inde-
pendent, identically distributed random variables converges to a limit, and the limit
belongs to one of three families of distribution (Coles (2001)). Two extreme case is
a product category with great upside uncertainty (Frechet) and that of predictably
finite bounds on the upside profit potential (Weibull2). For the general case (Gum-
2We call these type of innovations as New Frontier (or paradigm shifting) and Incremental inno-
vation respectively throughout the paper.
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bel), there are no specific limits on the profit potential, but the probability of outside
of central range is unlikely. To capture innovation performance, we also apply these
extreme value distributions.
In this study, main problem centers on process management’s effect on technolog-
ical innovation. More specific research questions are as follows.
•What is the optimal investment decision for firms between process efficiency and
new product innovation?
• How could this optimal investment decision be changed by product characteris-
tics (type of innovation) and the degree of competition?
First, we highlight the characteristics of type of innovation using extreme value
theorem. If R&D projects are new frontier innovation or independent with previous
activities - larger variance and fat-tailed distribution, there exist stronger adverse
relationship between efficiency and new frontier innovation than incremental innova-
tion, which is relatively small variance and finite bound. Second, competition effect
forces to decrease firm’s investment volume. We apply these two effects - innovation
and efficiency - into competition model using multinomial logit (MNL) market share
model. Basically, we find similar result with extant literature in innovation explaining
that competition result in underinvestment effort from the firms (cf. Fullerton and
McAfee(1999), Taylor (1995)). Thus, firms are more likely to focus on process im-
provement. For example, in the symmetric firms’ competition, their optimal number
of R&D project sharply decreased compared to that of monopoly case.
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Structure of paper is as follows. In next section, we briefly review related litera-
ture. In Section 3 and 4, we introduce key building blocks of innovation and process
management characteristics. In section 5, we apply innovation competition model
and proceed with equilibrium analysis. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
3.2 Literature Review
The role of innovation and process management has been examined in the busi-
ness strategy side of research. Benner & Tushman (2003) is the key motivation of our
paper. They claimed that process management is fundamentally inconsistent with in-
novation but incremental innovation and change. They defined type of innovation and
its relationship with process management, and process management is only suitable to
exploitative innovations involving improvements in existing components and build on
the existing technological trajectory, whereas exploratory innovation involves a shift
to a different technological trajectory. We do not review the literature on productiv-
ity dilemma issue in empirical side of research as it is quite vast, but, refer to the
excellent surveys in Gupta et al (2006), Adler et al (2009). The necessity of balancing
efficiency and innovation has not lessen after Abernaty’s observation. For example,
O’Reilly et al (2008) suggested how ambidexterity acts as a dynamic capability. They
suggest that efficiency and innovation need not be strategic trade-offs and highlight
the substantive role of top management in building dynamic capabilities.
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Our model consider statistical point of view on new product development model
combining the effect of process management. Dahan and Mendelson (2001), which
is starting point of our analysis, first developed a model from parallel draws from
extreme value distribution (Galambos (1978)). The expected performance outcome of
innovation is the highest realization of the parallel draw. The major accomplishment
of Dahan and Mendelson is that optimal solutions in innovation can be varied with
type of innovations, and we employ this model to identify the statistical properties
that influence the best performance. Many literature used this concept to develop
the models. For example, Girotra et al (2010) showed that independent structure
of innovation has higher performance than group of brainstorming. Terwiesch and
Xu (2008) modeled innovation contest in that one solver’s solution is the highest
outcome of parallel draws. Kavadias and Sommer (2009) showed similar research
with Girotra et al (2010), and they analyzed relative performance of two different
group using simulation model. All these literature considered Gumbel distribution
for their analysis. A economics literature Fullerton and McAfee (1999) explored the
optimal design of R&D tournament focusing on symmetric competitors. They also
find that the seeker suffers from underinvestment in effort by the participants.
To best of our knowledge, our paper is the first analytical modeling research in
productivity dilemma. A stream of research has investigated process management
effect in manufacturing/assembling area. Analytical models on process management
is divided by two main groups: cost reduction and quality improvement. Bernstein
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and Kok (2009) considered investment level in process management for cost reduction.
They explores the multi-periods model of supplier’s investment in cost reduction
activities done by Lean Production and Six Sigma during the life-cycle of the product.
Fine and Porteus (1989) considered single firm process improvement setting using
dynamic programming. They characterize optimal investment policy resulting in
set up cost reduction and process quality improvement. Li and Rajagopalan (1998)
demonstrated comprehensive model in process management, quality, and learning
effect. Their model shows that after considerable amount of investment in quality
improvement, this investment effort is decreasing.
3.3 The Model
We formalize investment strategy in new product innovation and process man-
agement. First, we assume that innovation performance and process management
compete for scarce resources (March (1991), Gupta & Smith (2006)). Thus, by de-
finition, more resources devoted to process management imply fewer resources left
over for innovation, and vice versa. - that is, high values of one will necessarily imply
low values of the other. Accordingly, the logic dictates that innovation and process
management can be viewed as two ends of a continuum. Second, we assume that
firm’s innovation performance can be estimated by maximum of multiple innovation
projects. As briefly mentioned in 3M inventor Arthur Fry, the goal of idea generation
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is to maximize the performance of the best idea. Firms prefer to have 1 outstanding
idea rather than 10 fair ideas. Former research on innovation has modeled the process
of creating ideas from extreme value distribution with parallel draws. Extreme value
theory explains the maximum value of multiple sample from an underlying distribu-
tion can be modeled as a function of three variables: the number of sample size, the
average, and the variance. The generalized extreme value distribution is:











where  is average performance,  is variance, and  is shape parameter3. Expected
performance of  number of project result in
[ ] = 
Z ∞
0




We classify the type of innovation according to the tail shape of their innovation
performance. Frechet distribution has fat right hand tailed innovation outcome, and
it is characterized as new frontier and paradigm shifting innovation. This type of in-
novation has breakthrough potential in their product. (ex. iPhone, 3D TV) Weibull
distribution is short tailed and bounded in upside potential, and it is classified as
incremental innovation in well matured industry. Thus, any gain due to innovation
in Weibull type of innovation tends to be bounded in innovation potential. Gumbel
distribution is considered as normally distributed R&D performance, and many aca-
demic papers in innovation use Gumbel distribution for ease of analysis. This paper
3The distribution is Frechet (Frontier Innovation in our model) if   0, Weibull (Incremental
Innovation) if   0, and Gumbel as  →∞.
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also considers Gumbel distribution for analytical tractability issue.
Discussion about cost function
In our model, variance  is important decision variable.  parameterizes innova-
tion potential and large  implies higher potential to create cutting edge innovative
product. Moreover,  intervenes in the unit innovation costs, and is an indicator of
degree of process management for firm. The main argument of process management
is to reduce variance. It might result in cost reduction, increasing speed to market,
improving R&D processes, etc (Kwak and Anbari (2006)). In this paper, we analyze
the effect of process management with cost saving point of view. As firm reduce its
variance () by various practice of process management tools, firms cost for innova-
tion is decreased. Thus, we assume that firm’s unit innovation cost is a function of
variance (). The coefficient  is a scale parameter, and  indicates generalized cost
function in innovation is following form: (  0 0    1, and   )
() =  ·  +
In many Operations Management literature, cost estimation models typically posit
a relationship of the form () =  · (cf. Jones & Mendelson (2011), Bhaskaran &
Krishnan (2009)4, etc.)5 Large  implies higher possibility to have better innovation
4Many other literature (ex. Cohen & Klepper (1996)) estimated convex cost function for inno-
vation quality. Since convexity is not a driving factor for our analysis, we open to other kind of cost
function such as linear or cancave in this analysis.
5Some models used quality as a key decision variable in cost function commonly assuming that
higher quality pays higher cost. Coincidence with these papers, we also assume that higher perfor-
mance in innovation pays higher R&D cost by intervening of  in the cost function.
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performance whereas higher unit R&D cost in innovation. Large  also implies lower
level of process management. Conversely, small  implies reduced unit innovation
cost as a result of process management. But, firms can expect limited potential in in-
novation performance. We further assume that  also includes organizational culture
implicitly. For example, many recent innovative firms such as Google and Gore-Tex
give its employee one day out of five working days to pursue their own creative ideas.
It enables firm to create paradigm shifting innovation, but more expensive unit R&D
cost.
Therefore, a generalized firm’s expected profit in innovation can be summarized
as follows:




(1− [ ()])−  · ()
We extend this model in competition. In the competition model, two firms decide
how many R&D project will be chosen in earlier stage, knowing that his competitors
are doing same kind of innovation projects. We start with two symmetric firm case,
and further analyze asymmetric firm’s innovation competition. In asymmetric firm’s
competition, we mainly focus process management effect with different variances (1,
2) and cost ((1), (2)).
The time line of model is as follows. First, the firm collects all possible idea of
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Figure 3.1: Time line of the Model
many projects will be selected within the budget6. Selected projects start innovation
process, and the firm considers process management activities to reduce total R&D
cost. Also, this R&D process is engaged in competition. After realization of profit
and new product’s performance, firms decide to launch new product or not. This
time line is also depicted in Figure 1.
In next section, we analyze characteristics of extreme value theory, and impact of
process management to firm’s profitability. And we continue with competition effect
on both innovation and process management.
3.3.1 Effect of  in firm’s innovation performance
Firm’s innovation performance can be determined by a project with the highest
outcome, our analysis depends on the distribution of the maximum of  draws from
the outcome distribution. Extreme value theory provides a relationship between the
number of projects a firm undertakes and the expected performance of innovation.
6Until this stage, it is an usual innovation process with parallel draws (Dahan & Mendelson
(2001)).
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A central notion in extreme value theory explains that when the limit exists, the
distribution of the maximum of i.i.d. random variables converges to one of three types
of distributions (Coles (2001)), known as the extreme value distributions according to
their tail shapes. Frechet distribution is considered when a innovation category with
high upside uncertainty such as paradigm shifting product. In such cases, products
might become ‘hot-seller’, characterized by fat right hand tail distribution. Weibull
distribution can be measured by highly predictable innovation. It has finite bound
on the upside profit potential of new product like incremental innovation. Gumbel
distribution is considered when there are no specific limits on the profit potential
from a new product innovation, but it has profit performance with central tendency.
Gumbel distribution is the asymptotic distribution for the maximum of multiple draws
from exponential-tailed distributions such as normal. These three extreme value
distribution and properties are summarized in Appendix.
In this section, we analyze innovation performance with different extreme value
distribution. To see the effect of variance, let 1 2   i.i.d random variables with
probability distribution  () where  () is generalized three extreme value distri-
butions (von Mises (1936)). The cumulative distribution of the maximum outcome
of  independent innovation projects is [ ()] . Using tail distribution, expected
performance of  project is
[ ] = 
Z ∞
0





































Let expected performance for new frontier innovation (Frechet) and incremen-
tal innovation (Weibull) distribution are [ ] and [ ], respectively. Since ex-
pected performance for new frontier innovation is higher than incremental innovation






. Marginal effect by increasing vari-
ance (decreasing process management activity) is, ceteris paribus, higher in Frontier
innovation than incremental innovation. On the other hand, process management
such as six sigma is less adverse effect in incremental innovation. Thus, we come up
with following lemma.
Theorem 14 By increasing variance () with reducing process management, its im-
pact for expected performance is higher for frontier innovation than incremental in-
novation. In other word, process management activities such as six sigma have more
adverse effect on performance of frontier innovation than incremental innovation.
Thus, in the innovation performance side, variation creating activities being widely
practiced in the top innovative firms have higher impact to firm’s capability to increase
innovation performance. On the other hand, if firm’s upside potential is limited such
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Figure 3.2: Characteristics of Extreme Value Distribution
as incremental type of innovation, variance increasing activities have limited potential
for firm’s performance. Consequently, variance reduction activities such as decreasing
creative activities or process management like six sigma has more reverse effect to
innovative firms. If a firm’s characteristics are a kind of efficiency oriented firm
with limited innovation potential, process improvement activities might helpful for
firm’s overall profitability. In the next section, we proceed firm’s process management
activities and its relationship with its overall profit.
3.3.2 Process management and firm’s Profit
Continued from previous section, we analyze process management effect on firm’s
profit in this section. We add cost term from previous section to estimate firm’s
profitability (Expected Profit = Expected performance - Total cost in innovation).
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As briefly mentioned in the model section, we assume that a firm’s cost function
is directly related with variance of innovation project (() =  ·  + ). Firms




(1− [ ()])−  · ()
Due to mathematical tractability issue, we employ Gumbel distribution in the per-
formance part from now on. Gumbel distribution is widely used to analyze parallel
innovation test ( . Terwiesch and Xu (2009), Kavadias & Sommer (2009), Girotra
et al (2010)). Even in Gumbel distribution, we can still distinguish new frontier in-
novation from incremental innovation in that different values of variable  stand for
the type of innovation. In Gumbel distribution,  is the scale of profit uncertainty.
Large  indicates frontier type of innovation (blue-sky research) since expected per-
formance with large variance is also higher. Relatively small  is for the incremental
innovation.
In Gumbel distribution, expected performance can be remarkably simplified as
follows:
[ ( )] = +  log +  · 
where  is Euler’s constant (w 057722). Thus, firm’s expected profit can be expressed
as:
[( )] = [ ]−  · ()
= +  log +  ·  −  · ()
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At initial stage, a firm decides howmany projects will be chosen within the budget.




Thus, optimal number of projects is increased when cost of unit project is smaller.
By Rewriting profit function with optimal ∗, expected profit can be simplified as
follows.
[( ∗)] = +  log

()






+  − 1
¶
To analyze six sigma effect on innovation, we apply generalized cost functions
(() =  ·  +) and measure marginal effect of .



















Its marginal effect can be divided by the following three cases.
Case 1. Cost saving effect is high by applying process management activities (i.e.
() =  · 2). (Recall that 0    1, and    : this condition ensure that








 ·  +  − 2
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 0. When 
decreases,  increases. Therefore, six sigma effect is higher than innovation effect






Process management effect is lower than innovation effect. As a conclusion, process
management effect does not have clear cut solution when cost saving effect is high.
It depends on the value of variance and coefficient of unit cost.
Case 2. Cost saving effect is linear by applying process management activities









+  − 1
First order condition for linear cost function is independent with . So, Process




 0. Therefore, process management is effective when unit cost is
high. On the other hand, process management has adverse effect in innovation.
Case 3. Cost saving effect is low by applying process management activities. i.e.
















is always greater than 0. When  decreases (increases),  decreases
(increases). So, when cost saving effect is low in process management, six sigma




is increasing function, adverse
effect of process management is higher in new frontier innovation. (less harm to the
incremental innovation.)
Proposition 15 (Process management effect and degree of cost savings)
() Even if process management effect is high in cost saving, it is not obvious that
process management effect such as six sigma is beneficial to new product innovation.
It depends on coefficient of cost function and variance of the performance.
() When six sigma effect is low in cost saving, it is not beneficial to apply process
management to increase profit for both incremental and frontier innovation. Their
marginal adverse effect by applying process management is higher in new frontier
innovation than incremental innovation. (process management effect  NPD effect)
() When there are large amount of fixed costs in product development, six sigma is
less beneficial than small fixed cost.
Thus, when the variation of innovation potential is quite large, process man-
agement effect is less than innovation effect. It implies that new frontier type of
innovation (large ) has more adverse effect for firm’s profit by applying process im-
provement activities. With all three cases of cost functions, its marginal effect for
firm’s profit is always negative. However, if cost saving effect is high such as case 1
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and there is limited upside potential, process management effect is favorable to firm’s
profit.
3.4 Competition effect in Innovation
In this section, we consider competition effect in innovation. Suppose two firms are
competing in a next generation product. In the competition, each firm should consider
number of projects, and six sigma effect in their innovation. Thus, each firm decides
in investment level of innovation and process management activities. To analyze
competition between two firms, we use Bell-Keeney-Little’s Multinomial logit (MNL)
market share theorem (Bell, Keeney, and Little (1975)). Let innovation performance
of firm  be specified as:  = 0+ log+ · from previous section (using Gumbel




. Thus, profit function for firm  is
[ ] =  · −  · ()
where  is parameter of market size.
3.4.1 Analysis of Symmetric firms
We start with two symmetric firms’ competition. Suppose two firms are identical
in innovation potential (), and unit cost of innovation (()). Then, Market share
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Profit functions of each firm are reduced to





− 1 · ()





− 2 · ()
First order conditions for each profit function are



















2 =  ·

4()
When  = 1, two firms’ optimal number of projects is only one—quarter of
monopoly firm. With same cost function, the marginal benefit by increasing one
project (

) of monopoly firm is 

. It means that firm’s performance (revenue) can
be increased by 

as monopoly firm increases one additional innovation project. How-
ever, in competition, the marginal benefit by increasing one project (1

) of one firm




2 . In the symmetric firms, after applying 1 = 2, competing










. In addition, when  firms are competing
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in innovation, optimal number of project for each firm is
(−1)
2·()  For example, in three




Proposition 16 Competition in new product innovation causes firms to invest less
effort to their R&D investment. When there are  firms competing in a kind of new
product, each firm’s generalized investment volume in equilibrium is
(−1)
2·() .
Counter intuitively, competition effect in new product innovation results in firm’s
underinvestment decision in equilibrium. This result is coincident with prior research
in economics ( . Fullerton &McAfee (1999)): Many solver on an innovation problem
will lead lower equilibrium level of investment (effort). Intuition behind this is that
negative externality is involved resulting in underinvestment in innovation.
3.4.2 Process Management effect in Innovation
Suppose two firms have strategy space (1 1) and (2 2). Then, market share






+1 log1+1· + +2 log2+2·
=
1 log1+1·






1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·
 [1] =  ·
1 log1+1·
1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·
− 1 · (1)
 [2] =  ·
2 log2+2·
1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·
− 2 · (2)
93
The objective function is strictly concave in 1 and 2, and the globally optimal
number of projects ∗ can be determined by differentiating  [] with respect to .






 0) can be found. Thus, we apply convex cost function for the





1 log1+1· · 1
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)1
− 
2(1 log1+1·) · 1







2 log2+2· · 2
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2
− 
2(2 log2+2·) · 2







1 log1+1·( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)
− 
2(1 log1+1·)( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2
¸





2 log2+2·( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)
− 
2(2 log2+2·)( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2
¸
−22 · · 2










































Proposition 17 Competition effect increases process improvement activities rather
than innovation activities. Size of innovation projects and optimal level of variation
in competition are decreased. When there are  firms competing in a kind of new





For a firm has higher variance than ∗, process management is beneficial to firm’s
profit. But, if firms have less variation than optimal ∗, process management is
adverse effect to the firm. As the number of firms are increased, firms are more
likely to encourage process improvement activities rather than increasing innovation
activities.














































(log +  − 2√

) (Concave cost function)






















) (Concave cost function)
It is impossible to find optimal level of  variable in the linear and concave cost
function, but we can see marginal effect by differentiating profit with respect to 
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(i) Unit cost (A) = 0.01 (ii) Unit cost (A) = 0.1
(iii) Unit cost (A) = 0.2
2( )c A  ( )c A  ( )c A 
Process improvement
Reducing  sigma
(iv) Unit cost (A) = 0.3
: concave cost function : linear cost function : convex cost function




). Marginal effect of process management is independent of variance in
linear cost function, and it is increasing function in concave cost function from above.
Also, for the illustration purpose, we provide each cost functions profit level with
different cost coefficients from unit sigma level ( = 1)7 in figure 5.
When unit cost is small ( = 001), every function’s profit is decreased with
7Different initial sigma values besides  = 1 have same pattern with figure 5.
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process improvement activities. It means that, in the relatively small cost of R&D,
process management activities are not beneficial for firm’s profitability. When unit
cost is increased, for example,  = 01, convex cost function’s profit is switched to
increasing function, and certain level of process management activities are maximizing
firm’s profit. But, for other functions, profit is increasing function in this range. When
unit scale parameter become larger, certain level of process improvement for all cost
fnctions, profit is increased.
3.5 Asymmetric Firms Competition
3.5.1 Different cost parameter
Among various asymmetric environments, we mainly analyze different cost coeffi-
cients 1 and 2 since cost coefficient is important role in investigating optimal size
of innovation projects and process improvement level. 1 and 2 indicate scale pa-
rameter of unit innovation cost. Different values in scale parameter imply two firm’s
initial unit R&D costs are different from each other. We further assume that two
firms cost parameters are observable to each other. Two firms have strategy space
(1 1) and (2 2), and each firm’s profit functions are as follows (From now on, we
applied convex cost function (2) to find out optimal level of ).
98
 [1] =  ·
1 log1+1·
1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·
− 1 ·121
 [2] =  ·
2 log2+2·
1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·
− 2 ·222




1 log1+1· · 1
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)1
− 
2(1 log1+1·) · 1





2 log2+2· · 2
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2
− 
2(2 log2+2·) · 2
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2 2
−2 · 22




1 log1+1·( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)
− 
2(1 log1+1·)( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2




2 log2+2·( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)
− 
2(2 log2+2·)( + log[1])
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2
−22 ·2 · 2








2 1 + 
(1+2)11 
2
2 (2111 − 1))







2222+12 2 + 
(1+2)11 
2
2 (2222 − 1))
(1 log1+1· + 2 log2+2·)2 2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− (2)
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1 2 1 2 6= 0, and numerator should be zero in equilibrium. Thus, equation





2 1 + 
(1+2)11 
2
2 (2111 − 1) = 0 (3)
2
21211 22 +2
2222+12 2 + 
(1+2)11 
2
2 (2222 − 1) = 0 (4)
In equation (3), and (4) we find important relationship between number of project
and variance and unit cost parameter. (3)-(4) can be reduced to
(111 −222)(111 + 222 )2 = 0 (5)
Therefore, in equilibrium, 111 = 222 condition should be satisfied between two






















In equation (5), we find important relationship among number of projects, degree of
process management, and cost coefficient.
Proposition 18 (The relationship between three variables)
() Smaller cost firm in innovation has larger number of projects than higher cost firm
in equilibrium, while higher cost firm has less number of projects. Also, higher cost
8It is not tractible to find optimal ∗1 and 
∗
2 in asymmetric case because variable 1 and 2 are
also located in power side.
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firm is more likely to reduce variance () using process management activities.
() With same cost coefficient, balanced number of project and process management
level for two competing firms in equilibrium is 11 = 22.
The most important insight in (5) is that in equilibrium, two firms are balanced
with cost coefficient, number of projects, and degree of process management. For
example, in the relatively cheaper unit cost of innovation, firms are more likely to
increase innovation activities, whereas expensive cost firm is more likely to spur in
their process improvement activities. Furthermore, when both firm has same  =
1 = 2 (such as same industry in innovation environment), optimal number of


























, which is same result in symmetric
firms’ analysis.
In addition, we also analyzed different average in innovation performance (1 6=
2) between two firms. Interestingly, it does not affect optimal number of project and
variance level (independent with average).
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Figure 3.5: Cavature of profit function with different  value
3.5.2 Comparative Statics
Firms can make use of different scale parameters in cost functions by increas-
ing(decreasing) the number of projects or by reducing variance () from process im-
provement activities. As mentioned before, it is impossible to find optimal  level
with closed form solution. Thus, in this section, we illustrate process management
effect by varying  for asymmetric firms.
Figure 6 depicts firm’s behavior with different scale parameters in cost functions.
When scale parameters (1 2) are small, it is slightly increasing function until a
certain value by increasing . For the relatively small cost of R&D, process manage-
ment activities are not beneficial for firm’s profitability. When unit scale parameter
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become larger (1 = 055 2 = 05), curve is switched to decreasing function when
scale parameter is larger. Certain level of process improvement increases firm’s profit.
It has similar results with symmetric firm’s analysis. In addition, this tendency is
still hold with different second firm’s 2 value.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop analytical models to explain productivity dilemma issue.
We mainly analyze the relationship between process management and new product
innovation performance using extreme value theory with generalized cost function in
innovation, focusing on how innovation performance and process management affect
firm’s optimal investment decision and the market equilibrium outcome. As seen in
3M case, there have been numerous debates about effectiveness of process manage-
ment activities. Although there are some other qualitative issues, we build a stylized
modeling approach considering some of important factors such as innovation charac-
teristics of product and competition.
The most important finding in this paper is that effectiveness of process improve-
ment depends the type of innovation. By increasing variance () with reducing process
management, its impact for expected performance is higher for frontier innovation
than incremental innovation. In other word, process management activities such as
six sigma have more adverse effect on performance of frontier innovation than incre-
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mental innovation. We also find that competition in new product innovation causes
firms to invest less effort to their R&D investment. Competition effect increases
process improvement activities rather than innovation activities. Size of innovation




A.1 Proofs of Chapter 1
A.1.1 Preliminary
Lemma 19 (i) In a sequential move (Stackelberg) game with substitute parameter ,
the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in terms of the order quantity () and
the profits () of the leader (informed firm) and the follower (uninformed firm) are:
 =
(2− )




(4− 2 − 2)
4(2− 2)   =










(4− 2 − 2)22
16(2− 2)2  

 =
(4− 2 − 2)22
16(2− 2)2
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(ii) In a simultaneous move (Cournot) game with incomplete information with sub-
stitute parameter , the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome in terms of the


































Proof. (i) If the informed firm puts in  and , the uninformed firm solves
∗ = argmax





( −  − ) =  − 
2
informed firm in turn solves for
 = max

( −  − ∗())
 = max

( −  − ∗())
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(ii) The informed firm and the uninformed firm correspondingly solve the following
simultaneous move game of incomplete information.
 = max

( −  − )
 = max

( −  − )
 = max

{( −  − )}+ (1− ){( −  − )}
The solution to the first order condition gives the order quantities and profits as
noted.
Proof of normal separating equilibrium
For existence of separating equilibrium, ∗ and 
∗




( −  − ∗())
 = max

( −  − ∗())
subject to
( −  − ∗()) ≤ ( − ∗ − ∗())∗ (1)









( −  − ) =  − 
2
Constraint (1) and (2) are incentive compatibility constraint. There is no incentive
to mimic the other. Also, since only constraint (2) is binding constraint, above
problem can be simplified as follows.
 = max





















 ≤ (2− )
22
8(2− 2)
Lagrangian of above formula is

























First order condition is
( )

≤ 0⇒ (2− )
2




 − (2− 2)
¶
+ 1 = 0
( )












 + 2 = 0
Solving above equations,
( −)(2− )(( − 2) +( + 2))
8(2 − 2) ≥ 0
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≥ 2 + 
2− 
Analysis of Costly separation for substitute case
When   2+
2− , sequential move’s order quantity and profit is as follows.





(2− 2)(2 − )−
q
(2 − 2)2( −)((4− ) − )
2(2 − 2)2
(ii) uninformed firm orders:
∗ =





2(2 − 2) + (2 − 6) +
q














(2 − 2) −
q






(2 + )(2− 2) +
q












2(2 − 2) + (2 − 6) +
q
(2 − 2)2( −)((4− ) − )
¶
4(2 − 2)2 )
2
Proof of pooling equilibrium
Let  and 

 the optimal pooling quantities for the informed firm. Suppose
∃ such that on observing this quantity, the uninformed firm cannot tease the true
demand state and sticks to his priors. Thus, the uninformed firm orders  where
∗() = argmax

{( −  − )}+ (1− ){( −  − )} = − 
2





( −  − ∗())
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( −  − ∗())















low type informed firm do not agree to pool at a order quantity ∗ for any reasonable
belief structure.
Next, the lowest order quantity for both high and low type informed firm can be
analyzed as follows. First, the high type informed firm prefers to pool as long as
profit of pooling dominate that of separating.
( −  − ∗()) ≥ max





( −  − ) =  − 
2
It is simplified to
( −  − − 
2
) ≥ (2− )
22
8(2− 2)
We get  ∈
∙



















For the low type,
( −  − ∗()) ≥ max





( −  − ) =  − 
2






2−2 − 2(2−2) +
√
(−)((5−)−−)
2(2−2) ]. Hence, the lowest pooling quantity for
the low type is 




Finally, we find the lowest demand interval (= ) for pooling equilibrium.
















(the minimum quantity of pooling is less than separating). It is simplified to
( − ( + (1− )))((4− ) − ( + (1− ))− 4( − 1)2  0
The above inequality is satisfied for  ∈ (1 4−2+22·−22
(2−)2+4·−22 )Therefore, the pooling
equilibrium exists for  ≤ 4−2+22·−22
(2−)2+4·−22 .
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A.1.2 Each play’s preference and the supplier’s leakage de-
cision
The informed firm’s trade-offs
First, in the high demand state, there is trade-off between demand uncertainty()
and substitute coefficient(). When  is decreased from 1, threshold level of uncer-
tainty parameter  for the preference of simultaneous move is increased. Consequently,
preference of the sequential moving area is decreased and the informed firm is more
likely to prefers to simultaneous move without information leakage. In certain level
(for example,  ' 05), the informed firm try not to leak their order information (wait
until time T) regardless of . Second, in the low demand state, When  = 0, both
sequential and simultaneous move has same profit caused by monopoly situation.
However, when  is increased, the preference of sequential move area is increased.
When  and  converges to 1, there is some region that simultaneous move is pre-
ferred. To check existence of probability of simultaneous move, first we should check
whether the informed firm orders positive quantity. To have positive ∗:
 +  ·  · −  ·  ·  0⇒   2
( − 1)
2








Thus, the low type informed firm always prefers sequential move. Also, informed firm
can take advantage of monopoly position with low .
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The uninformed firm’s trade-offs






















2(4 + )− 8)2 +(−64 + 2(64 + (−16 + (−16 + (8 + )))))
32( −)(2 − 2)2
−(2(4 + )− 8)
vuuuuut (
2(4 + )− 8)2 +(2(4 + )− 8)2
+2(−64 + 2(64 + (−16 + (−16 + (8 + )))))





2(4 + )− 8)2 +(−64 + 2(64 + (−16 + (−16 + (8 + )))))
32( −)(2 − 2)2
+(2(4 + )− 8)
vuuuuut (
2(4 + )− 8)2 +(2(4 + )− 8)2
+2(−64 + 2(64 + (−16 + (−16 + (8 + )))))
32( −)(2 − 2)2
Condition for these two profit function have intersection is

0 ≥ (
2(4 + )− 8)2
64− 2(64 + ((( + 8)− 16)− 16))− 8
q
3(2 − 2)2(16− 2(8 + ))
(A.1)
When  = 1, threshold  is 4.9733 (same with perfect substitute case), and when 
goes to 0,  is also converges to 0.
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An observation is as follows: When  is decreased from 1, preference of the se-
quential moving area is increased as quadratic fashion. It means that Stackelberg
follower’s profit is increased faster than Cournot model’s profit when  is decreased.
As a result, when  is decreased from 1, the uninformed firm’s strategy is strictly
preferred by sequential move.
The supplier’s decision
When demand is high state, the supplier always leak order information (same
with perfect substitute case). When Low demand state, in perfect substitute case, if
demand uncertainty is high, the supplier does not leak order information. If demand
uncertainty is low, supplier leak the order information. When  is decreased from 1,
the supplier’s preference of leakage area is decreased. The supplier can take advantage
of two monopolists - one is perfectly informed, and the other is uninformed - with
low .
Proof of Supplier’s leakage. Suppose informed firm’s order quantity is e
and e. If supplier leaks, uninformed firm orders −2 when demand is high and
−
2
when demand is low. For supplier not to leak, the following inequalities
should hold,
 ×





























e  − 
2 + 
e  − 
2 + 
To prevent leakage, the informed firm should order less than −
2+
for both high/low
demand state. But, the informed firm’s order at leakage case
(2−)(−)
2(2−2) has always
more profitable than ordering −
2+
for preventing leakage. Therefore, orders per profit
maximizing quantity
(2−)(−)
2(2−2) , supplier always leaks in equilibrium.
A.1.3 Equilibrium outcome of possible scenarios
The informed firm’s order and the uninformed firm’s order = (E, E)
Suppose the proposed equilibrium is Simultaneous move (Cournot model) with

















































It is the same with ordering early. Therefore, it is not a profitable deviation. Sec-
ond, when the uninformed firm deviate from early to late, its optimal order quantity
and profits are
 =
(4− 2) + 2
4 (2 + )
  =
(4− 2) + 2
4 (2 + )
 =
µ
(4− 2) + 2




(4− 2) + 2





(4− 2) + 2




(4− 2) + 2
4 (2 + )
¶2





). As a conclusion, ordering at (Early,
Early) is not an equilibrium point.
The informed firm’s order and the uninformed firm’s order = (Early, Late)
When the informed firm places order early, and the uninformed firm places order late,
their equilibrium order quantity and profit is as follows.
 =
(2− )




(4− 2 − 2)
4(2− 2)   =











(4− 2 − 2)22
16(2− 2)2  

 =
(4− 2 − 2)22
16(2− 2)2
First, when the informed firm deviates from early to late, game is changed with
































8(2+)2(2−)  0), it is not a profitable
deviation for the informed firm. Second, when the uninformed firm deviates from









Expected Profit of ordering late (original profit) is

µ









(4− 2 − 2)22
16(2− 2)2
Difference between original profit and deviated profit is
(2− )22
16
− (4− 2 − 
2)22
16(2− 2)2 ≤ 0
It is also not profitable deviation for the uninformed firm.
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Proof of Theorem 3 using Mixed Strategy Analysis. Suppose the un-
informed firm uses mixed strategy.  is the probability that the uninformed firm
places order early, and (1− ) is the probability that the uninformed firm orders late.
 and 

 denote optimal simultaneous and sequential move order quantity for the
uninformed firm respectively. Then the informed firm’s objective function is
 = max

 · ( −  −  ) + (1− )( −  − ) − 
 = max





( −  − ) − 
 = argmax

( −  − ) − 
 = max

 · £( −  −  ) ¤+ (1− ) £( −  −  ) ¤− 
Optimal solutions are
 =
(1 + )(2 + (1− )( −)− 2)2
8(2 + )2
 =
(1 + )( ·  · − (2 +  · ) − 2)2
8(2 + )2
 =
((2 +  +  · ) + (1− ) − 2)2
16(2 + )2
 =
( ·  · + (2 + 2 −  · )) − 2)2
16(2 + )2
 =
(− )2(1 + )2
4(2 + )2
Difference between expected profit of sequential move and simultaneous move for the
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uninformed firm is
 ·  + (1− ) − 
=  · ((2 +  +  · ) + (1− ) − 2)
2
16(2 + )2







 · ((2 +  +  · ) + (1− ) − 2)2





⎛⎜⎜⎝  · ( · + (2 + ) − 2)2 + (1− )( · + (2 + ) − 2)2












and it is always positive regardless of  and . Therefore, The uninformed firm
strictly prefer sequential move game to simultaneous game.
A.1.4 Endogenous Sequencing Game of Multiple demand states
In this section, we model multiple demand states. First, we analyze three de-
mand states case, and this can be generalized to more than three states such as
1 2  . For the simplicity, we analyze three state case for the analysis. The
demand intercept A is random and can take one of three values: a high value 
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with probability  , a middle value  with probability  , and low value  with
probability (1−  − ). The mean demand intercept 0 =  +  + (1−
 − ).
Lemma 20 (i) If the supplier commit not to leak the informed firm’s order informa-
tion with the uninformed firm, the game is simultaneous move (Cournot) game with
incomplete information. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of

































(ii) If the informed firm places order before the uninformed firm, and if supplier
commit to leak order information with the uninformed firm, the game is sequential
move (Stackelberg) game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit










































Proof. (i) The informed firm and the uninformed firm’s profit function for simul-
taneous move game is
 = max

( −  − )
 = max

( −  − )
 = max

( −  − )
 = max

( −  − ) + ( −  − ) + (1−  − )( −  − )
Using first order condition, its order quantity and profit are as noted.
(ii) The sequential move game’s model is as follows.
 = max

( −  − ∗())
 = max

( −  − ∗())
 = max













( −  − ) =  − 
2
Using first order condition, its order quantity and profit are as noted.
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Supplier’s leakage decision
First, when demand is high, supplier always leak the informed firm’s order infor-







for all probability). If demand
is either middle or low, supplier might not leak in some conditions. If the supplier
does not leak, the uninformed firm can infer that it is not high demand state (either




1−  ( −  − ) +
(1−  − )
1−  ( −  − )
= max

0( −  − ) + (1− 0)( −  − ) where 0 =

1− 










where 00 = 0 + (1− 0)







Regardless of demand probability 0 and 
0
, the supplier can better off by leaking
order information in the middle demand. Also, by same reason with previous section,
the uninformed firm can infer low demand state when the supplier does not leak.
Therefore, we can conclude that supplier will always leak order information even in
the multiple stages.
Equilibrium analysis
In the lowest state, the informed firm strictly should place order early to maximize
profit. If the informed firm does not order early, then the uninformed firm can infer
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that demand state is one of high state. So, the uninformed firm places order earlier
than the informed firm, and as a result, the informed firm’s profit function can be hurt.
Therefore, the informed firm always place order early to maximize profit.(Proposition
1 is still hold.)
A.1.5 Proofs of Information Acquisition Game
Two player game
When both two competitors can have demand information with cost of , four
possible scenarios and each player’s expected payoffs are in the Table 1.1.
Each firm’s best response depends on the value of . Let each firm’s profit
difference when competitor does invest 1, and let each firm’s profit difference when














































2(9− 8)− 16(1− )+2(1 + (7− 8))
¢
Proof of Proposition 5. First, when 0 ≤   min[12], (Invest, Invest) is
the only equilibrium for two competitors. When 1    2, (Invest, No Invest)
and (No invest, Invest) are equilibria. When 2    2, (Invest, Invest) and (No
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Invest, No Invest) are equilibria. When   max[12], (No Invest, No Invest) is
the only equilibrium. Sample figure of equilibrium is illustrated in figure 1.2.
Lemma 21 Even if the supplier can have a chance to acquire demand information,
the supplier’s expected profit by acquiring information is always less than expected
profit without acquiring information as long as positive information acquisition cost.
Proof. Suppose the case when the supplier acquires demand information, and let
two competitors that information. Also, let supplier’s wholesale price , and infor-
mation acquisition cost . First, when the supplier acquires information with cost
, selling quantity in high demand is −
3
for the both buyers, and selling quantity
in low demand is −
3









2×  − 
3
¶¶
 − = 2
3
(− ) −















and it is always greater than the profit of information acquisition.
Three player game
Lemma 22 (i) In the 3 player game with one informed firm and two uninformed
firms, when all players orders early, the game is simultaneous move (Cournot) game.
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of one informed firm and
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two uninformed firms are:
 =
4( − )− 2(− )
8
;  =
4( − )− 2(− )
8










4( − )− 2(− )
8
¶2
1 = 2 =
(− )2
16
(ii) In the 3 player game with one informed firm and two uninformed firms, if the
informed firm orders before the uninformed firms, and if the supplier commits to leak
order information with uninformed firms, the game is sequential move (Stackelberg)
game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit or one informed firm






















;1 = 2 =
( − )2
36
Proof. (i) High type informed firm, low type informed firm, and two uninformed
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firms solve the following simultaneous move game of incomplete information.
 = max

( −  − 1 − 2) − 
 = max

( −  − 1 − 2) − 
1 = max
1
 [( −  − 1 − 2)1] + (1− ) [( −  − 1 − 2)1]− 1
2 = max
2
 [( −  − 1 − 2)2] + (1− ) [( −  − 1 − 2)2]− 2
Using first order condition, its order quantity and profit are as noted.
(ii) If supplier leaks order information with uninformed firm, the game is sequential
move game with complete information (Stackelberg model). The model is as follows.
 = max

( −  − ∗1()− ∗2()) − 
 = max





( −  − 1 − 2)1 − 1
∗1 = argmax
1
( −  − 1 − 2)1 − 1
∗2 = argmax
2
( −  − 1 − 2)2 − 2
∗2 = argmax
2
( −  − 1 − 2)2 − 2
Using first order condition, its order quantity and profit are as noted.
Lemma 23 (i) In the 3 player game with two informed firms and one uninformed
firm, when all players orders early, the game is simultaneous move (Cournot) game.
127
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of two informed firms and
one uninformed firm are:
1 = 2 =
4( − )− (− )
12
; 1 = 2 =





1 = 2 =
µ
4( − )− (− )
12
¶2
;1 = 2 =
µ






(ii) In the 3 player game with two informed firms and one uninformed firm, if the
informed firms orders before the uninformed firms, and if the supplier commits to leak
order information with uninformed firms, the game is sequential move (Stackelberg)
game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit or two informed
firms and one uninformed firm are:
























Lemma 24 (Generalization) (i) In the n+m player game with n informed firms and
m uninformed firms, when all players orders early, the game is simultaneous move
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(Cournot) game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of n in-

































where  = {1 2  } and  = {1 2 }
(ii) In the n+m player game with n informed firms and m uninformed firms, if the
informed firms orders before the uninformed firms, and if the supplier commits to leak
order information with uninformed firms, the game is sequential move (Stackelberg)
game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium quantity and profit of n informed firms

























where  = {1 2  } and  = {1 2 }
When three competitors can have demand information with cost of , each firm
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faces following six case of scenarios and each player’s expected payoffs are in Table
1.2 with 1 =
7
144
( ·2 + (1− )2), 2 = 136 ( ·2 + (1− )2), 3 = 1482 +
42 · + 2( − 3)− 3( −)22. As a reference, 2 is always less than
1.
Proof of three player game. We check the best response of firm for every
possible cases. For example, when two competitors are assumed to invest, the best
response of firm is (Invest) when  is trivial. On the other hand, when  is higher
than Max [12 3], the best response is (No Invest). With same procedure,
following equilibrium can be found. First, when 0 ≤   min[1 23], (I, I, I)
is the only equilibrium for two competitors. When 2    min[13], (I, I, I),
(I, NI, NI), (NI, I, NI), and (NI, NI, I) are equilibria. When 2  1    3,
(I, NI, NI), (NI, I, NI), and (NI, NI, I) are equilibria. When 3    1, (I, I, I)
and (NI, NI, NI) are equilibria. When   max[12 3], (NI, NI, NI) is the only
equilibrium. Sample comparative statics are in figure #.
A.1.6 Relationship between the supplier’s different whole-
sale price and timing of order
Lemma 25 When the monopolist has a following trade-off between timing of order
and demand uncertainty - i.e. early order with demand uncertainty and late order with
certain demand, the monopolist prefer to order late as long as the supplier charges
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same wholesale price ( =  = ).
Proof. Let  be the selling quantity of the monopolist (retailer) and  be the
order quantity from the supplier.  is wholesale price. Monopolist’s payoff function
is
  =  () ·  − · 
 () ≤ 
First, suppose the monopolist places order early with demand uncertainty, his profit
functions are divided into three cases. First case is to order high enough quantity,























2 = ( −2)2 + (1− )( −2)2 −  ·2















































−  · 
2
Since 1 is always less than 2 , Monopolist’s profit functions are summarized
as follows.









































−  · 
2


















Second, when the monopolist orders late with updated demand information, his
order quantity depends on the supplier’s production quantity. (Since we will show




) of quantity for the case
of late order in the next lemma, the monopolist’s profit function depends on unit
availability.)
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2. When the supplier produces low demand case or quantity (−
2
) (When  


), then the late order monopolist’s expected profits are
 = 
µ











After comparing each profit functions, the monopolist can expect highest profit with
late order when the supplier produced high demand state quantities. One more thing
we need to consider is when the supplier produces −
2
units when realized demand
is high (push challenge). When realized demand is low, this ‘push challenge’ never
happen because the monopolist can order just −
2
even if the supplier produces
−
2
. The supplier will bear whole excessive production cost. So, push challenge
mentioned in the Cachon (2004) can happen if the supplier produces low demand
quantity.
Lemma 26 When the monopolist has demand uncertainty at early period, and that
demand is realized at late period, the supplier prefer to sell early.
Proof. Let  be the order quantity of the monopolist and  be the production
quantity for the supplier. Supplier’s objective function is
  = () ·  − · 
 () ≤ 
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When monopolist places order early, supplier can just produce monopolist’s order


















When monopolist places order late, supplier’s optimal production quantity is divided
into 3 cases.
(i) 1 ≥ −2
When the supplier produces greater than or equal to maximum level of ordering













 −  ·1
(ii) −
2
≤ 2 ≤ −2









 −  ·2
(iii) 3 ≤ −2
When the supplier produces less than or equal to minimum level of ordering quan-
tity, the supplier’s profit function is
3 = [ ·3 + (1− )3] −  ·3
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Let ∆1−2 is the difference between 1 and 2, and ∆2−3 is the difference between
2 and 3.













When  ≥ 2(1−2)
(−22+) , ∆1−2 is positive. So, the supplier would produce  ≥
−
2
(high quantity), and 1 is decreasing function of 1. Therefore, the supplier
will produce  = −
2
. when  ≤ (−)(−23−)
(+22−) , ∆2−3 is negative. So, the
supplier would produce  ≤ −
2
(low quantity), and 3 is increasing function of
3. Therefore, the supplier will produce  =
−
2
. When  is located in between
two value, the supplier will produce −
2
≤  ≤ −
2
. Rewriting 2 is ( ·  −





. When  ≥ 

, it is increasing function. Optimal production
quantity is −
2
. When  ≤ 

, optimal production quantity is −
2
. Therefore, the
supplier’s profit functions end up with two cases.






















After comparing each profit functions( and ), the supplier can
expect highest profit with early order with high demand state order quantities.
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Lemma 27 The supplier can provide discount to induce the retailer (monopolist) to
place early order. The maximum discount amount is the minimum of the following:
until when the retailer is indifferent with timing of order, and the supplier’s early
order profit is same with late order profit.
Proof. First, suppose the supplier’s decision is producing high demand state
quantity (−
2
when   

. i.e. relatively low production cost and high wholesale






















If the retailer places order early with demand uncertainty, both players’ expected
profits are





























































If   

and   
− , the retailer can provide discount to induce early order. (since
  ). After replacing  with −  for  , there is a  (1) which makes
two profit function in equal. 1 = −·+
p
2( − 2) + 2 − 2(1− )
The supplier’s profit is also affected by discount. Comparing both supplier’s profit




(+  ·)2 − 4(+ ) + 4 · 2) So, maximum discount the supplier can pro-
vide is min [1 2]  If  


and   
− , Retailer can also provide discount (since








So, maximum discount the supplier can provide is min [3 4]
Second, when   

, the supplier produces low demand state quantity if the
retailer places order late. Expected profit of the retailer and the supplier are
 = 
µ

















If the retailer places order early with demand uncertainty, both players’ expected
profits are same with previous case. If   

and   
− ,  is always
greater than . So, the retailer always prefers to order early. (no need to provide
discount). If   

and   




− ,  is always greater than . (no need to provide discount). If 0 
  




For the supplier’s perspective, when 0    




















− min [5 6]
Discount for the uninformed firm in competition
Lemma 28 Profit by providing any discount for the uninformed firm to induce early
purchase is always less than profit of sequential move for the supplier.
Proof. Suppose the supplier charges discounted wholesale price − for the early
purchasing customers and charges  for the late purchasing customers. When the
informed firm orders early and the uninformed firm orders late, each firm’s optimal
order quantity is
 =
 −  + 2
2
;  =
 −  + 2
2
 =
 −  − 2
4
;  =
 −  − 2
4
The supplier’s expected profit is
 =
µ
 ·  −  + 2
2






 ·  −  − 2
4






−  + 2
2
¶
( − ) +
µ




When both informed and uninformed firm places order early, order quantity is
 =
3 − − 2( − )
6
;  =
3 − − 2( − )
6
;  =
− ( − )
3
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The supplier’s expected profit is
 =
µ
 · 3 − − 2( − )
6
+ (1− ) · 3 − − 2( − )
6
+







(− ( − )) ( − )
The difference between first and second profit function (− ) is 112(+2)(−
− 2) and it is always greater than zero as long as low type uninformed firm places
order positive quantity ( −  − 2  0). Therefore, it is never optimal for the
supplier to announce a discount in the early period to induce the uninformed firm to
order early.
A.2 Proof of Chapter 2
A.2.1 Proof of Imperfect Information Game
Proof of lemma 8. (i) The informed firm and the uninformed firm’s profit
function for simultaneous move game is
 = Pr( =  = )[( −  − ) ] + Pr( =  = )[( −  − ) ]
 = Pr( =  = )[( −  − )] + Pr( =  = )[( −  − ) ]
 = [ =  ] + (1− )[ = ]
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where
[ =  ]
= Pr( =  = )( −  − ) +Pr( =  = )( −  − )
[ = ]
= Pr( =  = )( −  − ) +Pr( =  = )( −  − )
Equilibrium order quantity and profit for each player are as noted.
(ii) For the sequential move game,
 = Pr( =  = )[( −  − ∗()) ]
+Pr( =  = )[( −  − ∗()) ] (A.2)
 = Pr( =  = )[( −  − ∗())]




Pr( =  = )[( −  − ) ]
+Pr( =  = )[( −  − ) ]
∗ = argmax

Pr( =  = )[( −  − )]
+Pr( =  = )[( −  − )]
Equilibrium order quantity and profit for each player are as noted.
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